United Nations Development Programme
Country: Libya
Project Document

Programme Title: Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery

Strategic Plan Outcomes	*Outcome 3*: Countries have strengthened institutions to progressively deliver universal access to basic services *Outcome 6*: Early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post-conflict and post-disaster settings
Strategic Plan Outputs	*Output 3.2:* Functions, financing and capacity of sub-national level institutions enabled to deliver improved basic services and respond to priorities voiced by the public *Output 6.1:* From the humanitarian phase after crisis, early economy revitalization generates jobs and other environmentally sustainable livelihoods opportunities for crisis affected men and women. *Output 6.2:* National and local authorities / institutions, enabled to lead community engagement, planning, coordination, delivery and monitoring of early recovery efforts. *Output 6.4:* Recovery processes reinforce social cohesion and trust and enable rapid return to sustainable development.
CPD Outcome	Central and local government authorities are strengthened to provide better public services to citizens
Programme Outputs	**Output 1:** The responsiveness of local institutions in delivering essential public services in crisis-affected contexts and in leading recovery processes, is strengthened (*linked to SP Output 6.2*). **Output 2:** Municipalities and local communities have enhanced capacity to manage conflicts and promote social cohesion and community security (*linked to SP Output 6.4*). **Output 3:** Opportunities for diversified jobs and livelihoods opportunities for youth and vulnerable groups (including women) are enhanced through inclusive and participatory local economic recovery and development (*linked to SP Output 6.1*). **Output 4:** The functionality of the Libyan local governance system is enhanced by developing the policy framework, strengthening national institutions and promoting an inclusive central-local dialogue (*linked to Output 3.2*).

Executing Entity:	United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
Implementing Agencies:	UNDP, UNCT agencies

Brief Description

The Programme for '***Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery***' is a 3-year programme aiming to develop capacities of municipalities and other key state and non-state stakeholders at the local level in Libya to respond to the many conflict-induced challenges that impact negatively citizen security, access to and quality essential services, people's sources of livelihoods, the social cohesion of communities and, more broadly, unravels the social contract between state and society. To achieve its overall goals, the Programme will empower local actors to devise and implement multi-dimensional (or integrated) resilience and recovery plans that cater to essential needs of local populations for peace, security, basic services and economic livelihoods. This support will be provided through capacity-building, process facilitation, advocacy support, policy advice and targeted financing to public, civil society and private sector initiatives.

The Programme is built around **4 outputs:** (1) The responsiveness of local institutions in delivering essential public services in crisis-affected contexts, with particular attention to most vulnerable groups, and in leading recovery processes, is strengthened; (2) Municipalities and local communities have enhanced capacity to manage conflicts and promote social cohesion and community security; (3) Opportunities for diversified jobs and livelihoods opportunities for youth and vulnerable groups (including women) enhanced through inclusive and participatory local economic recovery and development; (4) The functionality of the Libyan local governance system is enhanced by developing the policy framework, strengthening national institutions and promoting an inclusive central-local dialogue.

The Programme will work in **15 municipalities** grouped in 6 clusters in order to promote inter-municipal response to local needs and foment area-based recovery dynamics. A three-track approach will be pursued whereby first priority will be given by the Programme to increasing local capacities to *cope* with the current crisis and produce rapid results to mitigate its social and economic impacts, especially on the most vulnerable groups (IDPs/returnees, refugees, migrants, women and youth). At the same time, efforts will be deployed to build core capacities of local actors to change negative conflict dynamics and put communities back on a path to recovery. If and when the general political and security context improves, and when in particular a Government of National Accord is formed and can function, the Programme will tackle longer-term reform needs in order to complete the transformation of local governance in Libya.

The Programme will be implemented directly by UNDP, with deployment of Libyan personnel right down to the level of targeted municipalities in order to support more effective capacity development and local ownership. Civil society organizations will be able to benefit from several training and grant scheme opportunities to contribute more effectively to local peacebuilding and recovery dynamics. Finally, the private sector and in particular Libyan MSMEs, is a prime target

beneficiary for this Programme as resilient stability in Libya depends for a large part on the capacity of local economies to create sufficient jobs and inclusive growth.

Programme Period:	2016-2018
Key Result Areas (Strategic Plan)	Outputs 3.2, 5.5, 6.2
Atlas Award ID:	_____
Start date:	01/01/16
End Date	31/12/18
PAC Meeting Date	_____
Management Arrangements:	DIM

Total resources required	27,145,761 $
Total allocated resources:	_____
• Regular	_____
• Other:	
o Donor	_____
o Donor	_____
o Donor	_____
o Government	_____
Unfunded budget:	_____
In-kind Contributions	_____

Agreed by (UNDP): _____

I. SITUATION ANALYSIS

1.1. Introduction:

The on-going negotiations between rival Libyan governments and political groups in Libya, under the auspices of the UN Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), has led to the signature of a political agreement on 21 September 2015 by some of the parties in conflict. As a first and fundamental step for its implementation, UNSMIL proposed on 8 October nominees for a Government of National Accord (GNA), the political dialogue is on-going with a view to sign a political agreement and to establish the GNA. In an effort to be pragmatic and practical and to avoid further delays in proactively initiating support on the ground, UNDP proposes to increase support to building resilience in Libyan cities and towns and to promote socio-economic recovery when and where possible.

The *Programme for Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery Programme* (hereafter the 'SCL2R', or just 'the Programme') has been developed on the basis of evidence availed through a nuanced assessment of the drivers and dynamics of the current conflict, its humanitarian and developmental impact and existing institutional capacities. Much of this evidence comes from UNDP's continuous engagement in Libya, and with Libyans, in facing the development and governance challenges arising after the 2011 revolution. Yet, the quality and availability of data in Libya is a perennial challenge and this situation has been compounded by the institutional fragility of the Libyan state during the transition phase and by the insecurity on the ground since July 2014. For developing this Programme, UNDP availed of several assessment exercises conducted by or with participation of UNDP, starting with the *Rapid Diagnostic on Local Governance and Local Development* (hereafter called, the Rapid Diagnostic, or RD), conducted by UNDP during the period March – June 2015 in 10 municipalities. UNDP also commissioned *Social Peace Assessments* in 13 municipalities (done by the Peaceful Change Initiative or PCI), which fed important localized data into an overall *Analysis of Instability and Insecurity in Libya* to be released by UNDP by end of 2015. UNDP produced two other very important studies in 2015 to understand the current context and plan an appropriate response, namely the *Women, Peace and Security Baseline Study* and the *Libyan CSO Mapping* (with UNICEF). Finally, UNDP also participated in the *Humanitarian Needs Overview* exercise conducted by the Humanitarian Country Team in 2015. It provides very valuable data on the current situation of basic services in Libya and protection issues. Other sources of information and analysis were also found in recent World Bank, IMF, UNSMIL and other development partners and are cited when used in this programme document.

1.2. Snapshot of the current situation in Libya:

After the fall of the Qadhafi regime in 2011, Libya entered a phase of transition from a highly centralised and authoritarian regime with a legacy of systematic human rights violations to a new semi-democratic system. The transition phase has been marked by deep political polarization and political fragmentation, culminating in open armed confrontations that erupted in July 2014. As a result, two rival government structures have surfaced, one in Tripoli and one in Tobruk, vying for legitimacy in policy-making and in controlling state resources. Security and political actors have become embroiled in battles aimed at

safeguarding factional and other political interests. Libyan security forces remain weak and lack proper command and control. Instead, a myriad of armed militias (up to 1,000 by some estimates) have increased their capabilities and armaments (coming for a large part from the weaponry stockpiled under the Qadhafi regime) and, consequently, their influence on all aspects of the life of Libyans. The year 2015 also witnessed the growing reach of terrorist groups especially those affiliated with Daesh that has now taken hold of areas in Sirte and Derna. While international focus has only recently shifted to the potential regional and global threat posed by such terrorist groups operating from Libya, the continuation of the conflict between the rival political camps will provide more space and time and contribute to the expansion of their influence and reach.

One of the immediate and most dramatic consequences of the conflict has been significant **displacement** and re-displacement, particularly in the western outskirts of Tripoli, in the eastern city of Benghazi and the southern region of Ubari. An estimated 434,000 people have been displaced in the country,[1] presenting rapidly increasing humanitarian needs and putting pressure on public services, livelihoods and social cohesion in host communities. Libya also hosts an estimated 250,000 foreign individuals considered as highly vulnerable given the current circumstances, and these are refugees, migrants (attempting to cross into Europe) and asylum-seekers.[2] Furthermore, the conflict has triggered an acute deterioration in the country's human rights situation with reported indiscriminate shelling of civilian areas, the abduction of civilians, torture and reports of executions, as well as deliberate destruction of property, among other serious abuses and violations of international law in various parts of the country. Women, children, minorities, IDPs and refugees suffer disproportionately form the violence and insecurity permeating every aspect of their lives.

In the most affected areas, the **delivery of basic social services** is disrupted and the capacity of state institutions to maintain a safety net diminished. The conflict impacts service delivery systems in various ways: direct damage to infrastructure, attrition of staff and other staff-related issues (e.g. late payment of salaries), increased financial costs involved with operations and maintenance, breakdown in the institutional oversight and coordination, and more. These direct and indirect impacts exacerbate pre-conflict deficiencies that affected all public services in Libya across the board, and especially in the South. Many education facilities have been destroyed, particularly in the East (73% of the schools are not functional in Benghazi)[3] and in just nearly two years of severe instability, the country's rate of school attendance by school-age children fell from nearly 100% to 82% nationally. Health services are the most badly impacted (20% of public hospitals are not functioning) as they depended heavily on foreign personnel that has since left the country. Health needs linked to conflict and combat injuries are not properly covered. The rate of vaccination coverage of young children has fallen to an alarming 54%. Water supply, sanitation and electricity services are also affected – though in an uneven manner across the country (with the West usually hit harder) due to direct infrastructure damages caused by the hostilities and the breakdown in operations and maintenance capacities of these state-run services. Service delivery has been historically centralized in Libya but with the conflict spreading and intensifying, newly created municipalities have been attempting to fill in the gaps of the centralized service delivery machinery, but face dire shortages of technical and financial means to do so.

On the economic side, the significant loss of oil exports has caused economic recession since mid-2013.[4] Being the primary source of income for the state, the fall in oil export revenues has caused total revenues to drop by 61% in 2014 (from LYD 54.8 bn in 2013 to less than LYD 21.4 bn in 2014). Oil production dropped to an average of 0.5 million bpd in 2014 (down from 1 million bpd in 2013) due to strikes and ongoing conflict. This has resulted in real GDP contracting by 24 % in 2014. The government's budget deficit in 2014 reached 43.5 % of GDP, which is the highest ever recorded. Large fiscal and current account deficits could deplete official reserves within two to three years if the current situation persists as the various factions compete to control them and threaten the capacity of the state to honour the public service payroll and commitment to food, fuel and electricity subsidies (domestic subsidies and public salaries represented 69 % of GDP in 2014).[5] Recent assessment findings[6] show that overwhelmingly stable employment in the public sector is the major contributor to household income.[7] The consequences of the historical lack of economic diversification of the Libyan economy and the continuing plunge in oil revenues are undermining the standards of living of the population, compounded by the sharp rise in the costs of basic goods and

[1] Source: UNHCR, June 2015.
[2] 67% of them report feeling unsafe (Source: HNO, 2015).
[3] Source: HNO, 2015, as for all other figures in this section.
[4] World Bank: Libya Overview March 2015 http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/libya/overview#1
[5] Ibid.
[6] Humanitarian Needs Overview, June 2015.
[7] Preliminary Findings Overview: Inter agency assessment 2015

services, contributing to widespread frustration and despair. The private sector remains embryonic and the risks of doing business in Libya are among the highest in the world. This is exacerbated by the rise in 2015 of extreme violent groups. Efforts to diversify the economy and develop the private sector and to tackle the current estimated unemployment rate of 19.9 %, including different SME Funds and SME incubators, as well as skill and vocational training of youth, have been dampened by the political context and breakout of conflict.

A political dialogue between rival political factions and parliaments has been on-going since January 2015 under UNSMIL mediation (in accordance with UNSCR 2213). Talks are structured into multiple concurrent tracks: a) political; b) security; c) tribal leaders; d) political parties; e) municipalities; f) women; and g) civil society. The main ('political') track includes three main delegations: the internationally recognized House of Representatives (HoR), the former General National Congress (GNC), and a group of independents, including boycotters from both the HoR and the former GNC as well as representatives of civil society. The security track includes leaders of armed formations. Other tracks aim to increase inclusiveness of the dialogue and ensure that any proposed political agreement remains relevant to various Libyan stakeholders. While, as previously mentioned, UNSMIL's facilitated dialogue has resulted in the initialling of the agreement in July 2015 by all participants except representatives of GNC, at the time of writing, a Government of National Accord supported by all sides has not yet been established. The political dialogue seems unable to overcome the opposition of influential spoilers who wish to derail the process.

Libyan women and girls are disproportionately affected by the current conflict and many women who are visibly engaging in public affairs have been increasingly targeted. The spreading violence is threatening almost every aspect of their security, putting in question the survival, livelihood and dignity of women and girls. In addition, the lawlessness and impunity that is currently increasingly gaining ground in Libya, is putting women and girls at additional risk of sexual and gender-based violence. As seen in other contexts, conflict and instability tend to increase domestic violence given the additional psychological problems affecting men involved in fighting. According to the founder and president of the NGO "Voice of Libyan Women", since the end of the Libyan conflict in October 2011, domestic violence and other gender-based violence has been exacerbated due to a decrease in law and order and a lack of accountability for such violence.[8] Unfortunately, due to a lack of confidentiality, specialized staff and physical reporting outlets, combined with the social stigma attached to this matter, violence against women goes widely unreported and there are no credible figures available. More generally, the conflict exacerbates women's marginalization in the political, social and economic life in Libya. While Libya showed an encouraging ranking on UNDP Gender Inequality Index in 2013 (55th out of 186th), with the conflict and violence against women rising, the targeting political and social activists and the tightening of social and cultural norms imposed by armed groups, one can expect that Libya's ranking has further slipped downward.

1.3. Conflict Analysis:

While the political dialogue process facilitated by UNSMIL has provided opportunities for a political settlement to the current crisis in Libya, many of the underlying political, ideological, economic and social factors leading to the crisis remain to be addressed. In fact, since the fall of the Qadhafi regime, Libyans have not had a meaningful opportunity to engage in public dialogue around questions of how the Libyan state should be organized, the social contract, and how horizontal relations should be managed. As a result, and due to competing political interests and perspectives, little consensus on a vision for their country has emerged among Libyans. Without some kind of formal process to build broad consensus regarding these issues, competing perspectives will continue to be expressed in a divisive manner through media, political behaviour and through violence. Related to this is the lack of clarity over Libya's protracted transitional process. The constitution drafting process continues to be delayed due to political instability and insecurity. The proliferation of armed groups in Libya and the absence of a state monopoly on the use of force have central and determinative roles regarding instability and insecurity in the country. The most notable manifestation of this is the threat or use of force by armed groups in support of their political objectives and interests. Aligned with factional and political actors, militias provide an opportunity for these actors to apply pressure on, or act as spoilers of, political processes. The lack of any counterbalance to armed groups' effective veto on political processes and administrative decisions poses a significant threat to the stability of the Libyan state.

The dire state of the Libyan economy, in terms of lack of diversification and extreme exposure to instability on the oil market, threatens not only the national budget but the very livelihoods of millions of Libyans. This

[8] Source: *Christian Science Monitor*, 14 March 2013

lack of opportunity and growing uncertainty drives participation in illicit economic activities such as smuggling and drugs, arms and human trafficking, further undermining peace and stability in the country.

The role of local governance structures in Libya has strengthened since 2011 and even more since the start of the current crisis, as the power of central government has waned. Efforts exerted by municipalities to fill in the gap in local service delivery, security maintenance and other socioeconomic support are important for societal resilience but, in the absence of central government supervision, they may also contribute to the growing autonomy of local areas and further destabilization of the country.

Without strengthening a common vision for Libya amongst Libyans, reducing the role of militias, improving economic opportunity and settling the relationship between local authorities and the central state, Libya is likely to continue to experience insecurity and instability. There are no credible and viable alternatives to the current UNSMIL-facilitated dialogue and since 21 October 2015, Libya has endured a vacuum of legitimate political power since that day marked the end of constitutional mandate of the HoR. On the basis of today's conditions, one or a combination of the following scenarios is mostly likely for the near future:

(a. **A pessimistic scenario of total state collapse** caused by reversal of progress made on the dialogue and escalation of the conflict. Under such scenario, large-scale violence could spread to most of the country bringing high civilian casualties, human rights violations and displacement on a much larger scale than currently experienced. With the disappearance of any functional central government institutions, municipalities would be left to their own devices to continue providing for populations' needs but with a massive cut in the available resources to do so. A conflict economy would further develop and reinforce regional disparities and hardships for vulnerable groups. This scenario is mostly likely if negotiations over the annexes of the agreement break down or if the GNA is established but collapses due to political infighting or the actions of spoilers shortly after its formation.

(b. **A middle-ground scenario of continuing political divisions and fragility,** under the weakened legitimacy of a unified government, only partly accepted by the various parties in conflict. The inability of such GNA to overcome political infighting and to challenge armed groups and political factions would result in progressive deterioration in the security, social and economic wellbeing of the population, while oil revenues would continue dwindling and more areas suffer from a security vacuum. As dialogue process would continue and still retain some credibility, with the prospect of an eventual acceptable solution, the military situation on the ground would not massively escalate. The two competing national governments would still be able to provide a semblance of leadership and assume minimal core government functions (in particular related to PFM) necessary to enable service delivery. Criminality, especially in Tripoli, Benghazi and Sabha, would rise and the justice and law enforcement agencies unable to curb it. Elsewhere, there might be pockets of stability allowing for timid progress in local economic recovery but without a political settlement, sustainability could not be guaranteed.

(c. **A more optimistic scenario of final political agreement** giving space for political negotiation and a compromise formula for the immediate future, resulting into the formation of a legitimate GNA. This is the intended outcome of the current UN facilitated political dialogue. It is based on the assumption that the end of current division of government and resumption of international support, particularly allowing state access to its financial wealth, would provide the space necessary for Libya to complete its transitional process, paving the way for a new government that can undertake major legal and institutional reforms and an earnest social and economic recovery.

1.4. Local governance and local development in Libya in times of conflict:

The conflict has had a contrasted impact on the sub-national level in terms of socioeconomic and human security conditions, depending on the intensity of the political polarization and fighting existing in different areas but also on existing capacities of local institutions.[9] However, its impact on the importance of sub-national governance has been largely uniform in the sense that with an increasingly paralyzed centre for policy-making and public finance management, local institutions, and chief among them municipalities, are seen among the population as the main guarantors of their basic needs still being covered. Municipalities are making efforts to respond to these high expectations and try to strengthen local coping mechanisms against the debilitating effects of the conflict. This implies in particular reinforcing local crisis response mechanisms (through Local Crisis Committees[10] for example) and increasing partnerships with other local governance actors to face the immediate consequences of the national crisis and prevent further localized conflict. Yet,

[9] Usually linked to whether a municipality is newly-formed after the 2014 elections or inherited from the previous shaabiyat system.
[10] Local Crisis Committees provide non-food items and food aid to people in needs, including illegal migrants in detention centers and refugees.

all local governance actors are plagued by critical capacity gaps that limit their ability to assume heightened responsibilities and are also hit by dwindling central government support, whether financial, technical or else.

Following is a more detailed review of the current situation of local governance and local development systems in Libya and how it is impacted by the conflict.

An unfinished legal framework

The adoption of the Local Administration Law (Law 59) in 2012 marked the first major attempt toward building a local governance structure in the wake of the 2011 revolution. While the constitution drafting process which commenced in 2014 will ultimately decide on the question of the form of state, including the question of decentralization, the creation of elected municipalities was necessary to respond to strong pressure from local elites and communities yearning for greater autonomy after decades of heavy central rule, and was also seen as an essential step in the long-term project of consolidating responsive, effective and accountable local level state institutions.

Nearly two years after the adoption of the law, due to politically-sensitive negotiations between the Government and the General National Congress (GNC) on the matter of local elections, 90 out of 106 municipal councils have been elected, mayors chosen among their members and municipal administrations (or diwans), established.[11] The municipal elections constituted the first practical steps in the shift from a highly centralized state system to a more decentralized one. However, after the adoption of Law 59, the situation barely changed for a number of reasons:

(i) the law fails to delineate and clearly divide responsibilities of the various tiers of government and state institutions in the planning and delivery of public services and promotion of local development;
(ii) the actual implementation of the law, and in particular the revision of a number of existing laws organizing the social and economic sectors and the issuing of application by-laws and decrees, had only partially started by the time the political and security crisis suddenly worsened in July 2014;
(iii) while Law 59/2012 proposes a two-tiered local governance system (municipalities and governorates), only municipalities have been established so far.

Due to the conflict, issues with the legal framework organizing local governance in Libya have not been addressed and will probably not be until legitimate political institutions are in place. In the meantime, some municipalities are trying to organize themselves to push for a rapid revision of Law 59 by the future (hypothetical) GNA. Municipal associations are being formed in the South and the West to build a stronger advocacy force on such matters as they perceive, rightly so, that there has been a sheer lack of consultation of local stakeholders, including normal citizens, when developing Law 59. Concomitantly, the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) has recently finished drafting articles describing the proposed decentralised structure of the future Libyan state. Their proposal gives tremendous powers to governorates (over municipalities), something which is also bound to create much debate between national and local polities. Besides the lack of consultative process around the reform of local governance in Libya so far, the process has also lacked visioning and strategic policy and planning processes, which should rest on an objective analysis of the pros and cons of different options for decentralisation.

A fluid local governance structure

The current local governance system remains centralized – but with a central government that is, with every day passing, less capable of fulfilling its command, control and guidance roles. On the one hand, executive bodies of line ministries at municipal level enjoy limited deconcentrated authority and continue organizing the delivery of most public services as per the modalities of a centralized state system. On the other, the newly-elected municipalities, with a stronger veneer of legitimacy than both central governments, find themselves having to address the population's humanitarian and development needs but with limited responsibilities and resources devolved to them to actually organize an effective response. Relations between the two levels of government vary from one location to another, but in general have been deteriorating since the conflict started. These relations are now marred by limited contacts, poor coordination (even at the local level between executive bodies and municipal councils), failing trust, absence of guidance on the division of responsibilities (even when this is more needed than ever due to the crisis context), decreasing and unpredictable financial support and limited to non-existent technical and capacity

[11] Local elections started in November 2013 following a phased process, which, in principle is still on-going as not all municipal councils have been yet elected.

development assistance. During the Rapid Diagnostic, only 1 in 10 municipalities surveyed considered that their relations with central government were good.[12]

In principle, civil society in Libya should be an important local governance actor (especially given its exponential growth since 2011)[13], including human rights advocacy groups, women and youth associations, community-based organizations and local NGOs providing charitable assistance to vulnerable groups (including IDPs and migrants) as well as certain social services (e.g. literacy classes). If municipalities show in general a favourable attitude toward the role of civil society in local affairs, concretely cooperation with CSOs is limited outside of civic awareness raising initiatives. There is a lack of understanding and capacities on both sides to envisage new effective avenues for cooperation, in particular for testing different forms of participatory governance or filling the gaps of the public administration in service delivery. Municipalities lack funds to support local civil society activities, but at the same time are suspicions of external funding sources these organizations may avail, as they see it to a potential threat their sovereignty over local affairs.

As per Law 59, municipal councils all have at their disposal in general a shura council composed of a few non-political personalities and experts for advisory support in local policy-making. Local councils of elders, tribal leaders and religious figures also represent important local governance partners for matters relating to social peace and local security, especially in the South. In contrast, formal relations with the private sector are under-developed and the involvement of private businesses in providing public services or partnering with state institutions for local economic development, remains marginal.

Security-related entities have also become powerful actors in local governance remain. This does not concern so much the national police or the Army (when present), but rather the myriad of brigades or militias that the country now boasts. While the prerogatives and actual performance of the national police in keeping law and order have been severely impacted by the conflict,[14] there is evidence of growing consolidation of municipalities with informal armed groups in many locations. If the common and most stated purpose for such rapprochement is a desire to preserve community security in a context of collapse of the rule of law and exploding criminality, the reality seems to be that in certain localities, municipal officials and armed groups may also find common political and economic interests in aligning their powers and actions.

Horizontal relations between municipalities are marked by both negative localized conflict trends leading sometimes to violent confrontations (especially in the Nafusa Mountains and in the South), but also by positive collaboration on matters related to security, service delivery, culture and sports.[15] Yet, formal inter-municipal cooperation to spur local development is mostly unheard of, except where supported from outside (e.g. Greater Benghazi planning process with ACTED assistance). Unresolved border disputes between municipalities (especially after the creation of nearly 80 new ones), growing tribalism in a context of dereliction of national identity, the inexistence of governorate institutions and the absence of formal template to sustain inter-municipal initiatives, explain the weak level of horizontal integration in Libya.

This overall mapping of the local governance system in Libya gives the picture of a dynamic situation that is increasingly distinct from the vision set forth in Law 59 (see Annex 2 for organizational charts comparing the *de jure* model to the *de facto* situation). The basic principles of local autonomy in decision-making, public-private partnerships (in the broader sense, including civil society and communities), citizen engagement, inclusion and accountability in local governance remain to be well understood and applied by all concerned stakeholders. While municipalities appear as increasingly powerful local actors (for a good part because central government's authority is quickly dissolving), their leadership over other key stakeholders is not well established everywhere (in particular in the South vis-à-vis tribal structures) nor sufficiently organized, making the whole local governance edifice fragile and prone to dysfunctions in case of conflict escalation.

Limited capacities impacting on the performance of municipalities

During the Rapid Diagnostic, only 1 in 3 municipalities self-assessed themselves as performing well their core functions. In fact, few municipalities manage to effectively engage in all the mandated areas assigned to

[12] The Rapid Diagnostic showed that only 1 in 3 municipalities considered that the quality of coordination with local executive bodies was good, while 8 out 10 municipalities underlined the ineffective division of responsibilities with central government and the same number complained of a very weak technical support and financial support forthcoming from the center to help them assume their functions (UNDP Libya, 2015).
[13] An average of 1 registered CSO per 3,400 inhabitants (lowest: 8,000 / highest: 322) was found in the localities surveyed for the Rapid Diagnostic.
[14] 50% of the municipalities surveyed considered the role of the police in maintaining law and order as weak, mostly limited to traffic control.
[15] 8 out of 10 municipalities surveyed report some form of collaboration with their neighbor(s) but only 1 in 10 had initiated joint development planning.

them by Law 59 and that include: (i) preserving local peace, security and social cohesion; (ii) coordinating and providing basic services; (iii) promoting local and regional development and sound natural resources management. If municipalities seem to make their best efforts to respond to urgent community needs during periods of acute crisis, but the lack of resources, experience and the absence of adequate procedures and capacity-building for accountable public expenditure management (development planning, budgeting, project implementation and monitoring) seriously dampens their capacity to strengthen societal resilience and recovery in the longer term.

Out of the 106 municipalities in Libya (in fact, only 102 have been established so far), only 22 existed as shaabiya under the previous regime. These 'old' municipalities usually avail human resources and assets inherited from that period. In contrast, 'new' municipalities have often had to start from a blank slate or, in some cases, benefited from a foundation of capacity built during the transitional period if a local council was functioning before the municipality was created. Yet, interim local councils were unstable in their composition, often devoid of qualified staff and operated for a large part outside of any regulatory framework as the transition government was slow in setting it up. This difficult – and geographically uneven – situation that prevailed before the current conflict has worsened as a result of its negative impact on human, financial and asset resources of municipalities. This impact is not only caused by direct war damages[16] in some locations, but also by the soaring needs of the population for services (especially where high concentrations of IDPs are found) and of the similarly soaring operational costs for local authorities.

Below is a quick review of the situation in terms of **municipal resources** (staff, finances and assets) as diagnosed from the Rapid Diagnostic.

(i) Human resources: staffing levels in municipal administrations (diwans) vary tremendously between locations,[17] as the use of a standardized streamlined municipal organizational structure as proposed by the Ministry of Local Governance (MoLG) is not yet generalized. The largest municipalities have inherited bloated workforces (mostly seconded from the central administration) from the shaabiyat era while new municipalities also received secondments from the public administration but in lesser numbers. All municipalities were given permission to recruit staff until the MoLG put a freeze on all new recruitments in December 2014 for fiscal reasons. Some municipalities remain under-staffed as a result. The Rapid Diagnostic showed that municipal staff are mostly assigned to administrative or manual work functions, even though municipalities employ large numbers of university graduates, alluding to a misuse of staff qualifications[18] and lack of proper human resource management systems (limited use of job descriptions and staff appraisal methods).

(ii) Local finances: municipalities' main – and often only – source of finances remains transfers from the central government distributed through MoLG under the second chapter of the National Budget (Steering and Operational Expenditures). Municipalities receive their yearly transfer in quarterly tranches but delays are systematically experienced since the conflict started, creating cash flow issues for municipalities. State transfers are supposedly calculated on the basis of population figures, but regularly the inter-governmental transfer system is under accusation of favouritism and corruption from certain municipalities that consider themselves discriminated against. Officially, municipalities are not granted the permission nor given the regulatory tools to collect local revenues; yet, in practice, several municipalities have started doing so, sometimes in agreement with local executive bodies (whose task it is normally to collect local revenues) but also sometimes outside of any legal framework (e.g. custom taxes reportedly collected by municipalities on Libya's borders). Municipalities also make use when they can of private donations from communities and businesses to attend to urgent rehabilitation needs of public facilities. The great majority of Libyan municipalities remain however highly dependent on central support and hence highly vulnerable to the impact of the current crisis on national-level public finances and financial systems.

Municipal budgeting and financial management has improved after the first chaotic years of the interim local period and the majority of municipalities are now capable of submitting timely estimated budgets to MoLG. The use of computerized accounting system is also quasi-systematic and the Ministry of Finance maintains some oversight over municipal spending through their financial controllers. Yet, the full extent of the necessary statutory control and reporting requirements from municipalities to the central government is not achieved. Municipalities use their budgets mostly on salaries for temporary staff, other operating costs and on the purchase of assets. They are also supposed to use it towards the maintenance of

[16] No precise quantitative evaluation available so far.
[17] From 1 staff to 800 inhabitants to 1 staff for nearly 6,000 inhabitants (sample of 7 municipalities).
[18] In 6 municipalities surveyed, administrative and manual workers form 51% of the workforce against 39% for managerial and technical staff. 64% of municipal employees are temporary contractors and 75% of municipal staff are university graduates (but great variation between locations).

service delivery facilities (schools, health centers, local roads, etc.). The bulk of the local service delivery budget is managed by executive bodies with little if any coordination with and scrutiny by municipalities. Similarly, capital funds destined to municipal-level infrastructures, coming from the Ministry of Planning, are only distributed through line ministries and with very limited coordination with local authorities. Local executive bodies are not systematically involved in planning the use of capital investment funds. In the end, municipalities have very limited financial visibility and autonomy, as they do not know the total amount of funds allocated to the functioning and development of their territory by the central government and therefore can hardly influence service delivery and local development through their policy-making mandate. Furthermore, the absence of reliable and transparent procedures for financial management (including procurement), just as is the case at central level, favours the spread of corrupt practices in municipalities, which could rapidly become detrimental to citizens' trust in their local authorities and in turn further derail the social contract.

(iii) Asset management: the situation with assets (buildings, land, equipment) of municipalities is problematic as many of them inherited a depleted asset base from previous interim councils (no proper hand-over organized) and asset management systems are underdeveloped.[19] Municipalities also fail to account the much larger asset base granted to them by Law 59 since, in principle, ownership of service facilities and some of the state land falling within their limits have been transferred to them with the new law.

Limited managerial and administrative municipal capacities as well as an inefficient division of responsibilities between central, local governments and non-state actors impact negatively **core local governance processes** and the overall performance of local governance systems in helping communities cope with the conflict.

A first area of concern is municipal policy-making, normally under the purview of municipal councils. There is evidence that the effectiveness of such function is limited, with municipal councils displaying great legislative activity level[20] but with limited results in terms of influencing local affairs and overseeing the performance of municipal administrations and executive bodies. The relation between the legislative and executive arms (e.g. mayors) of municipalities remains often contentious and would need much stronger safeguards to preserve the council's independence and oversight function.

Planning practices are usually very weak,[21] starting with the lack of reliable socioeconomic data at municipal level on which to plan service delivery and local development strategies. Horizontal and vertical planning streams are not integrated, and municipal budgets as a result may overlap sectorial budgets (and vice-versa), leading to wastage of public finances. When municipalities make an effort to engage in long-term strategic planning for their development, they cannot rely on a standardized approach coming from central government that would, for instance, guarantee a good level of complementarity between national and local development goals and the effective localization of global targets (i.e. the Sustainable Development Goals). Instead, municipalities hire private companies and universities to help them with their planning needs, opening the door to a large range of approaches and, at times, dubious practices which make it even more difficult achieving integrated regional development planning. Usually, such planning efforts do not include widely civil society, communities or the private sector. Annual programme-based plans linked to multi-year investment plans are unheard of; instead, sectorial plans made of shopping lists of projects remain the norm.

Project execution is mostly left to executive bodies as municipalities do not manage directly investment budgets allotted to their territory (except for small rehabilitation and maintenance works). In general, local projects are executed completely from the central level, bypassing local authorities. Project implementation costs are high due the inefficiency of a centrally-controlled execution and widespread corruption in public procurement practices. Municipalities lack capacities and tools for monitoring and evaluating their performance and the effectiveness of service delivery and local development investments and citizen scrutiny on these is almost nil as well, facilitating corrupt practices on an increasingly large scale.
Finally, citizen outreach and participation seem to be increasing in many places, but following poorly structured processes consisting mostly in consultative exercises (e.g. town hall meetings, surveys) and basic grievance-handling mechanisms (e.g. complaints box, local user committees). In the Rapid Diagnostic, 40% of the municipalities surveyed report making efforts to better include citizens in municipal governance but

[19] Only 1 in 2 municipalities keep an asset inventory system, which is computerized in only 20% of the cases (Rapid Diagnostic, 2015).
[20] The Rapid Diagnostic found that only 1 in 5 municipal council is able to function as per provisions set forth in Law 59 and that only 1 in 5 as well considers it has real influence on local policies, including budgets and development plans – all this while the average number of decrees issued by municipal councils in the locations surveyed was 39 for 2014.
[21] Not one municipality surveyed had a functional database in place (though 1 in 3 was said to be in the process of establishing one). Only 1 in 5 municipalities report using some kind of strategic planning tool and only 1 in 10 municipalities mentioned efforts to integrate annual municipal and sectorial plans.

only 20% have formally engaged civil society and communities in their annual or strategic development planning process. Formal links to the community level (*mahallat*) are still missing, except through regular consultations with Mokhtars.[22] Innovative social accountability mechanisms, such as community score cards, are also unheard of.

According to Law 59, one of the main areas where municipalities are supposed to exercise their elected mandate is **organizing the delivery of public services** meeting their constituents' specific needs. Yet, as mentioned before, the Law did not succeed in defining clear frameworks for the division of responsibilities between line ministries and municipalities, nor in guaranteeing sufficient human and financial resources to local authorities for taking greater role in service delivery. Even if the law was free of its current flaws, the lack of political will and power at the center of government to bring key line ministries to decentralize their powers – a problem that is all more acute in the current context of atomization of central authority – is a major challenge. The result is that municipalities only play a marginal role in delivering services (see Annex 3), even if there are nuances to be applied to this statement between locales. More municipalities are trying to relieve, with whatever means they can avail of, urgent bottlenecks in service delivery caused by the conflict (e.g. organizing alternative shelters for IDPs that were residing in school buildings during the first months of the conflict).

Service delivery in Libya has been directly impacted by the conflict in terms of infrastructure damage, staff attrition, increased operational costs (e.g. due to soaring fuel prices) but these disturbances have also exacerbated pre-existing deficiencies, including: (i) absence of use by central and local governments of reliable needs assessment methods, local targets and quality standards based on gender-disaggregated indicators; (ii) absence of efficient organizational structures for service provision, coordination between actors involved and monitoring systems that would create effective feedback loops to quickly attend to coverage and quality issues; (iii) inappropriate selection of personnel in executive bodies and service facilities based on patronage more than qualifications; (iv) very limited public-private partnerships, whether civil society, private sector or traditional structures, for service delivery, impacting negatively on coping mechanisms in times of crisis; (v) general lack of understanding and evidence on exact issues affecting service delivery systems and coverage levels, limiting capacity of users, civil society, media and other independent actors to advocate for change.

Local conflict management, social cohesion and community security

Libyan society has strong traditions of informal dispute resolution involving informal community leaders and tribal authorities. Municipalities are also emerging as key actors in the local conflict management equation and joint efforts between formal and informal actors in addressing local disputes and low-level conflicts before they escalate are increasingly common. This is evidenced, for example, by ceasefire and prisoner swap agreements reached between formerly warring communities in the west of the country, or by the use of leaders from other communities to mediate and monitor the resolution of local disputes. Such processes are effective conflict management mechanisms which can de-escalate tensions and provide frameworks for addressing future disputes, contributing to immediate security and stability within the area. There is the hope that such endogenous capacities for conflict management, with additional technical, political and financial support, can help mitigate if not arrest the slide into more violence. Yet, generally, however, local conflict resolution efforts do not address the fundamental causes of conflict and do not represent broader peacebuilding processes.

These drivers of conflict at the local level are many including: (i) historical grievances between different communities; (ii) the perceived status of 'winners' and 'losers' in the broader political processes affecting the country, determining access to power, influence and resources from central government; (iii) the sense of marginalization from political processes of those who had fought against the previous regime; and, (iv) in some cases, explicit criminal interests fuelling conflict at local level. Local conflict dynamics are also heavily influenced by higher level drivers of conflict including the recession of the Libyan economy, inflammatory media coverage, open borders and migration, disputes over citizenship and a very high rate of proliferation of weapons. In some cases radicalization and ideological motivation also plays a role in heightening the conflict.

Community security and access to justice

While Libya continues to see repeated waves of instability and unpredictable upsurges in violence related to the on-going political struggle over the national leadership, there is also a growing challenge to the every-

[22] Mokhtars are state-paid community representatives at mahalla level.

day security of Libyans, refugees and migrants.[23] The spread and mass ownership of weapons is the primary driver of insecurity in Libyan towns which suffer unprecedented rise in murder rate and accidental killings, along with armed robbery, extortion, kidnapping, violent land and property conflicts, and more. IDPs, refugee, migrants and minorities whom lack personal, tribal or community connection to their place of residence are usually more vulnerable to interpersonal violence than average Libyan citizens.

In the absence of a functioning police and justice, small arguments evolve rapidly into the use of arms and inter-clan feuds lead often to revenge killings, looting and burning of property. Smuggling at all levels is common and exacerbated flourishing after the country's border control system has collapsed and feeds criminality. As a response to the soaring criminality, neighborhood vigilante groups are proliferating and established militias, inherited from the revolutionary period, also try to maintain law and order in their cities – when they are not running their own organized crime network.

Tribal and community structures have become central to both perpetrating and reducing revenge violence, and instructing and controlling militias. Local governance institutions play in general a limited role in providing security oversight and management, although this may vary significantly from one municipality to another. A common problem is a lack of actionable information on criminality and limited capacities of local decision-makers for policy-making in this area.

Livelihoods and local economies

The conflict has undoubtedly exacerbated pre-existing **socioeconomic vulnerabilities** in Libya and created new ones, as 71% of Libyan households surveyed for the Humanitarian Needs Overview reported stable or decreasing incomes.[24] If government subsidies and households savings are still able to provide a buffer to the conflict impact, the duration of such coping mechanisms in a status quo or worsening scenarios is highly uncertain.[25] Among Libyan citizens, **IDPs** are the most critically impacted by the conflict in their livelihoods and cannot envisage returning to their places of origin, where homes and socio-economic infrastructure have been destroyed and local political environment are not conducive to their return. The exception so far is in the city of Tawergha (near Misrata) where the return of the long-term displaced population is currently ongoing, but needs urgent recovery support given the extensive destruction suffered by the city.[26] The most affected areas with IDP arrivals include Benghazi, Misrata, Zintan and the Nafusa Mountain area, Warshafana, Zawiyah and various locations around Tripoli. There, IDPs and communities are equally affected by diminishing access to education, affordable health care, electricity and other key services.[27]

The other major vulnerable group in Libya is formed by **third-country nationals (refugees, asylum-seekers, migrants)**. Until recently, asylum-seekers from Syria and Eritrea had benefited from a relatively positive situation in Libya (including free access to education and healthcare) but things started to unravel soon after the current conflict started. This population group, along with IDPs, see their livelihoods most impacted by the crisis, spending more than 55% of their expenditures on housing and food compared to host communities (43%).[28] Migrants are subjected to arbitrary arrest, harassment and intimidation, detention for an indefinite period of time, and (often unpaid) forced manual labour.[29] The Department to Combat Illegal Migration (DCIM, under the Ministry of Interior) maintains about 8-9 detention centres holding nearly 5,000 people.[30] UNHCR and IOM confirm that there are also unofficial detention centres – inaccessible to them – raising serious concerns about the lack of protection of individuals held in these facilities.[31]

The conflict has also deepened **structural issues slowing the economic growth**, including obsolete economic infrastructure, high unemployment rates, especially among the youth (around 30 %),[32] inadequate rights at work, lack of freedom of association, a weak social protection system and absence of social dialogues.

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[23] UNDP's Rapid Diagnostic showed that municipal leaders interviewed ranked by order of priority the following drivers of criminal violence: 1. increase in the circulation of arms; 2. drugs and human trafficking; 3. ineffective policing, and 4. arrival of IDPs and illegal immigrants.
[24] Preliminary findings of multi-sector Needs Assessment 2015
[25] Ibid.
[26] Protection Working Group briefing by OHCHR. September 2015
[27] UNHCR June 2015
[28] REACH survey 2015
[29] *Migration Trends across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots.* Altai, 2015
[30] IOM, Sep. 2015
[31] Altai, 2015.
[32] According to the ILO Key Indicators of the Labour Market (KILM), activity and employment rates remain quite high compared to other countries of the region (53.4% and 49.2% respectively in 2011). European Training foundations (ETF); 2014.

The current **labor market structure** is particularly problematic to sustain any kind of economic diversification and growth. With a bloated public sector paying higher than average salaries, white-collar jobs are more highly sought after than any other forms of employment and private firms outside of the service industry struggle to find sufficiently-qualified and motivated Libyan workers.[33] Traditionally, gaps in the job market were filled by unskilled migrant workers; yet man of them have fled the country due to direct threats on their lives and the general economic downturn. On a positive note, compared to other countries in the Arab region[34], Libya showed a higher level of **women participation in the labor market** with about 27of women included in the labor force (against 77 % for men) in 2014. Areas open to women's work included nursing and teaching for educated and skilled women, administrative and clerical work, cottage-style industries and domestic service.[35] No reliable recent data exist on the labor market after the conflict erupted in 2014, but it is expected that women workers have been disproportionately affected by the rising unemployment, in particular due to increasing security risks bearing on women in the current context.

When the conflict started in 2014, the **Libyan private sector** was already characterized by a global downturn that had started in 2013 and was hitting particularly medium-sized companies. Micro-enterprises, often trading and retail companies less exposed to big contracts and operating in local markets – continued experiencing growth during that period. Nowadays, all types of business, regardless of their size, are impacted by the conflict, and especially those operating in Tripoli, Benghazi and the South. Only the private sector in Misrata and in the East outside of Benghazi showed signs of resilience amidst the crisis.[36] Firms report experiencing reduced revenues, work stoppages, supply chain issues (e.g. lack of access to imported goods, petrol and raw materials), problems with staffing due foreign workers leaving the country in large numbers and local staff unable to reach their workplace due to poor security conditions.[37]

Local economic and institutional actors report a high need for support on economic recovery at local level. Law 59 (and decree 448/2014) strengthen in principles of mandate of local authorities over **local economic development** (LED). Mayors should normally avail the support of the Ministry of Economy's executive offices at municipal level, as well as support from other institutions and programmes devoted to economic and private sector support,[38] to develop and implement LED strategies. Yet, these resources remain overwhelmingly managed by the line ministries with very little coordination and involvement of municipalities, whose potential role in LED is actually not understood nor really acknowledged.[39] This affects also the role of other local actors such as civil society and local firms themselves in the planning and implementation of interventions aimed at promoting the recovery of local businesses, creating jobs and generating income opportunities for youth at risk of engaging in armed violence and illegal activities. Lack of in-depth assessments on potentials and challenges for local economic growth including national and local statistics on poverty and vulnerability levels (by age and gender), unemployment data at the local level and regional economic comparative advantages also impede the capacities of municipalities to develop and implement LED strategies and plans.

A closing space for women's participation in peacebuilding and local governance

The space for women's participation in society, including in local decision-making and conflict management, has been reduced further due to the conflict partly due, but not solely, to the deteriorating security situation. Indeed, after the revolution, a growing conservative cultural and religious discourse sought to confine women to traditional house-bound domestic roles, while they had achieved access during the previous regime to many sectors usually reserved to men, such as the military and police forces – roles that have now almost completely disappeared. Women's participation in transitional governance structures remained limited with only 16% of women members of the GNC (elected in 2012), 10% for the CDA and 12% for the House of Representatives elected in 2014.

Women's level of **participation in local governance** is contrasted. On one hand, they have gained access to municipal councils (but only after a mandatory quota of one woman per council was imposed by law) and

[33] A recent private sector survey showed that 30 % of firms are unable to find sufficient workers with the necessary skills (*Libya Investment Climate Survey 2015*, World Bank).
[34] The labor market participation rate of women in Arab countries range from 12-27% according to the World Bank
[35] Ibid.
[36] 66% of surveyed businesses witnessed a decrease of their sales during that period. Source: *Simplified Enterprise Survey and Private Sector Mapping – Libya 2015*. World Bank, 2015
[37] Ibid.
[38] National SME Development Programme (Ministry of Economy), Job Placement Centers (Ministry of Labor), Ministry of Planning and the Municipal Planning Departments, Business Development Centers in some cities, Chambers of Commerce in Tripoli, Misrata, Benghazi and Sebha.
[39] Findings of the Rapid Assessment

overall, 12% of all local councilors in Libya are women. Yet, only 38% of eligible women voters participated in local elections (vs. 62% of registered male voters).[40] Women in local councils feel isolated and lack support from their male colleagues[41] and the broader institutional system. As a sign of this difficult situation, not a single woman local councilor was chosen as mayor by a municipal council.[42] Women can also contribute to local governance as municipal staff but UNDP's Rapid Diagnostic revealed that such role remains limited as only 19% of municipal staff in the locations surveyed are women, and mostly assigned to clerical positions. In fact, most women actively involved in the local governance and local development arenas do it through civil society. 15% of all CSOs in Libya define themselves as women organizations, but women are present in many other sub-sectors of civil society. A recent surveys shows that 20% of Libyan women are taking part in civic activities related to social and political matters in 2013, and this figure goes as high as 46% in the East of the country. [43] The influence of women CSOs at the local level should not be minimized and many seem to work in good partnership with municipalities in order to address women's needs and issues; if not financially, women CSOs' work is often supported politically by local executives or through in-kind assistance (e.g. use of municipal infrastructures). The use of gender-mainstreaming tools for local policy-making is however unknown in Libyan municipalities and the need for such approach is usually not recognized nor understood.[44]

Women's **participation in the security and conflict management sectors** at the local level is not well researched but expectedly very limited. This is due to societal disapproval, stemming from a general cultural aversion towards including women in the traditionally male-dominated sphere of security and conflict management, and a specific social stigma in particular towards women in the security sector related to the use and inclusion of female security staff during the Gaddafi era.

1.5. Challenges and opportunities for strengthening local capacities for resilience and recovery:

Pathways to recovery at the local level in Libya are of course highly dependent on resolving the broader security, political, institutional and economic challenges plaguing the country. The security situation in particular will only be durably addressed when the state begins implementing a profound reform of the security sector, including demobilizing militias and helping their socioeconomic reintegration. The rising levels of criminality and local warlordism can only be addressed if the state takes firm actions to restore the rule of law and empower the police and judicial institutions to perform their missions. Politically, any political settlement among national factions will need to be inclusive of local claims as well and provide compensations to address entrenched real or perceived horizontal inequalities – otherwise the risk of local groups taking up arms again remains high. Moving from a state of quasi-statelessness to statebuilding brings the challenge of reforming the public sector and instill governance practices that guarantee better responsiveness and accountability of the state machinery at all levels. In a country as urbanized and as little diversified economically as Libya, the recovery of local economies is largely tied to the country's macro-economic prospects, which are right now facing the huge challenge of falling oil revenues and the need for major fiscal reforms. All these challenges, to which could be added the difficult transition of social and cultural norms towards those fitting better an inclusive and democratic society, form an ominous backdrop to the goal of building local capacities to cope better with the current conflict situation (resilience) and to eventually engineer positive upward trends towards peace, security and prosperity (recovery).

Building upon the analysis of the current situation of local governance and local development in Libya, below is a summary of the immediate challenges to improving the resilience of local communities and supporting their gradual recovery, but also on the opportunities available to do so even in the current very difficult context facing the country. Fitting with the complex local peacebuilding and statebuilding nexus, these elements are presented in four areas, which also form the framework chosen for the proposed Programme: 1) capacities for service delivery; 2) social cohesion; 3) livelihoods and local economy; 4) reforming the local governance system. The role of women in local governance and peacebuilding is also considered as a cross-cutting theme. Finally, the roles of municipalities in contributing to progress in these four areas, and their capacities to do so, is central to the analysis below.

1) Capacities for service delivery

[40] Women's turnout in local elections was also lower than any other preceding elections since the transition started in 2011.

[41] UNDP's *Women, Peace and Security Survey*, conducted in 2014 with 14 focus groups and dozens of individual interviews, reveals that women councilors face practical issues (e.g. late night meetings) and cultural issues (e.g. verbal intimidation from male counterparts during council sessions) which constrain their role as men's peer in decision-making.

[42] Only one woman was elected as Deputy Mayor (Tajoura) and was acting mayor for two-months after the designated mayor had resigned.

[43] Source: IFES, *Libya Status of Women Survey 2013.*

[44] 7 in 10 municipalities interviewed by UNDP reported supporting regularly women's civic education campaigns. Yet, only 1 in 10 municipalities used gender-disaggregated data for planning purposes.

Challenges	Opportunities
1) Municipalities do not have a clear mandate over service delivery, leading to their marginalization on the ground by line ministries and state agencies in planning and organizing the delivery of public services. 2) High level of compartmentalization among actors, state or non-state, involved in service delivery at the local level with a lack of systems and capacities for joint needs assessment, planning, execution, monitoring / quality control and public outreach. 3) Weak administrative, managerial and technical capacities in municipalities (in particular new ones) and pre-existing institutional deficiencies in local state institutions (including nepotism and corruption) are exacerbated by the crisis. CSOs and private sector have a modest impact on service delivery due to limited capacities, understanding of the roles they could play and lack of incentives for public-private partnerships. 4) Financial resources for sustaining and developing service delivery at the local level are both insufficient and inefficiently used. Central government subsidies are mostly spent on operating costs. Municipalities do not have control over investment funds destined to local development and generate only very marginal amounts of local revenues (often outside of their legal mandate).	1) Municipalities show in general readiness to improve systems and practices and openness in working with other stakeholders, including civil society, tribal leadership and private sector, if they are provided with tools and capacities to do so. 2) Municipalities corresponding to former shaabiyat's capital have a stronger capacity base, which should allow reaching faster results if provided with adequate support and build useful models for effective dissemination to other new municipalities. 3) Existence of multi-partner Local Crisis Committees that can be strengthened to respond better to immediate service delivery needs and provide a first platform for strengthening collective problem-solving. 4) Significant financial resources to support reconstruction and recovery of local service delivery systems can be made available rapidly from the central budget if a proper delivery mechanism can be put in place (e.g. Local Development / Recovery Fund).

2) Social cohesion

Challenges	Opportunities
1) Existing local dispute resolution mechanisms are good for avoiding escalation but fail to address deeper-seated conflict drivers that limit the prospects of genuine peacebuilding. 2) Municipalities do not have a clear understanding of what their roles in promoting peace and establishing better community security and access to justice (outside of increasing the strength of armed responses to the threats on local security), could be. 3) Mechanisms and capacities for dialogue and collective action around issues of local conflict management, security and social cohesion, when they exist, lack inclusiveness and effectiveness (evidence-based planning is particularly weak). Women's access to such platforms and how their needs are addressed by them is a particular challenge. 4) The conflict is having direct adverse consequences on the social fabric in many communities and creates legacies that will be a source of enduring fragility if steps are not taken rapidly to increase access to some form of reconciliation and justice	1) Shared cultural and religious values and principles among the different groups in Libya, which makes easier addressing the divides around regional and tribal lines, reduce and enhancing commonalities across lines of conflict. 2) Readiness among communities and informal actors (tribal structures, religious leaders, civil society) to engage with municipalities in order to manage conflict and improve social cohesion. Such engagement is critical to rebuild trust in state institutions and secure a resilient social contract. 3) Existing local infrastructures for peace (security committees, women/youth groups advocating for peace, conflict resolution mechanisms led by municipalities, etc.) can be strengthened and expanded, including across municipal lines. 4) Existing capacities of traditional structures to adjudicate interpersonal disputes on which a bottom-up approach for promoting access to fair justice can be built in partnership with civil society for legal aid provision and legal empowerment.

3) Livelihoods and local economic development

Challenges	Opportunities
1) Local actors, and municipalities in particular, lack knowledge, systems and incentives to support Local Economic Development (LED), starting with collecting needed statistics, building viable economic strategies, but also supporting local SMEs and promoting job creation, in particular for youth. 2) Efforts to diversify the country's economy remain overwhelmingly top down and suffer from the inefficiency characterizing state-run enterprises and programmes, giving little attention to strategies for localized economic development. 3) Entrenchment of war economies fueled by illicit trafficking	1) Resilience of the private sector in some regions, especially in sectors related to construction, manufacturing and retail; and numerous sectors with high growth and job creation potential[45]. 2) Existing initiatives taken by different business development support institutions (business associations, Chambers of Commerce) to lobby government for improving business environment (e.g. banking sector reform, bank loan guarantee fund, taxation reforms, free zones).

[45] Including petro-chemical industry, renewable energy (particularly solar energy), maritime sector and related industries, air transportation, agriculture and food processing, and domestic tourism.

and profitable to local actors with military power. 4) Financial resources necessary to promote local economic growth and the development of SMEs is not readily available to municipalities and other local actors.	3) Build upon existing national and local initiatives geared to solve labour market issues and promote SME growth (e.g. MoL Job centers, National Programme for SMEs,[46] National Economic Development Board[47]). 4) Legal framework promotes greater role of local authorities in LED.

4) Reforming local governance systems

Challenges	Opportunities
1) Intergovernmental relations are severely affected by the conflict, adding to unresolved issues of incoherent / incomplete legal framework and remaining strong culture of centralization. 2) The central government is not in a position to provide effective regulatory and technical guidance to municipalities, especially for more effective crisis response. 3) The policy debate on the future shape of the local governance system is not open and inclusive enough, and lacks in particular visioning and critical thinking on the pros and cons of different available options. 4) Municipalities are asserting their leadership and new facts on the ground, and claiming additional powers faster than the local governance system can possibly be reformed in a context of high political uncertainty.	1) Engage with the Committee for Local Administration Strategies, created in 2015 by the Tripoli government, to align sector policies with Law 59, which could gain far more influence on improving the overall legal framework for local governance in the advent of a GNA. 2) Opportunities exist to improve the current framework through regulatory actions that remain within the prerogatives of concerned ministries and do not need legal reform. 3) Municipal associations are under establishment and the political agreement foresees the creation of the Supreme Council for Local Authorities, which should facilitate greater inclusiveness in the policy reform process. 4) Good ICT infrastructure and capacities across the country allowing boosting e-solutions for intergovernmental relations and citizen participation.

5) Women's participation in local governance and peacebuilding

Challenges	Opportunities
1) Women lack the required information, knowledge and skills to confidently advocate for their larger participation in local governance and peacebuilding, better protection and higher contribution to local economies. 2) The level of political knowledge amongst a majority of women is still very limited and there is little evidence of concrete commitment among policy-makers, whether at central or local level, to change the status quo dramatically.	1) On-going efforts to promote women's participation in peace and security affairs in line with Libya's commitments to UNSCR 1325 (e.g. women track in the UNSMIL-mediated dialogue; women members of "wise persons committees" in various localities to solve local conflicts). 2) Many Libyan women role models showing that women are not just helpless victims of war and violence, but also astute peacebuilders, politicians and activists.

1.6. Mapping of development partners' support to local governance and local development:

In spite of the serious crisis engulfing the country, several donors have maintained (after recalibration) their support to local-level governance and development processes, while all have suspended cooperation with central government institutions. New programmes building municipal capacities to face the crisis are also being designed and launched as increasingly municipalities are seen as legitimate state actors to engage with for building societal resilience and strengthening state-society relations. In a situation of protracted conflict with no rapid ending in sight, donors are keen on finding alternative ways to support the Libyan population than humanitarian assistance only.

A donor coordination group on local governance support has been established in August 2015 to facilitate information exchange and promote complementarity both geographically and thematically among the various on-going and planned programmes. Nearly 20 donors and agencies are represented in this group chaired by the German Embassy, with the largest programmes in this area funded or implemented by the EU

[46] Run by *Libya Enterprise*, an independent agency established in 2012, for of the oversight, planning, financing and management of the SME sector in Libya, with focus on promoting entrepreneurship among youth through skills training, business incubators, feasibility studies, and project funding.
[47] Body affiliated to the Ministry of Planning to develop strategies for boosting employment of demilitarized fighters within the public and private sectors, in coordination with the former WAC (Warriors Affairs Commission) – now Libya Programme for Reintegration and Development (LPRD). The LPRD has showed poor results so far but has built Libya's first and only comprehensive database of 162,000 former revolutionaries

(through ACTED and VNG), the United States (through IRI, Chemonics and Creative), Germany (through GIZ), as well as UNDP and UNICEF.[48]

Thematically, priority is put among donors on building core managerial capacities of municipalities as well as increasing their contribution to the humanitarian response (in particular towards IDPs) and to maintaining public services. Support to civil society for nurturing citizen participation in local governance, especially among youth and women, is also an important area of action. Comparatively, two areas of support to local authorities, which UNDP prioritizes under this Programme, are less covered: livelihoods/local economic recovery and social cohesion/community security. Most development partners have re-oriented their activities towards strengthening local crisis response capacities, but some continue working on longer-term development processes (e.g. ACTED supporting strategic development planning in Benghazi and Greater Tripoli) as well as on improving the policy framework (e.g. IRI). Donor programmes tend to deal with just one or two areas of support at a time; integrated programming across social, economic and stabilization areas is not the norm.

Geographically, donor support concentrates on less than 50% of Libyan municipalities (48 out of 106),[49] and within these, 10 municipalities benefit from the support of three or more donors each.[50] 60% of donor-supported municipalities lie in the West, against 21% in the South and 19% in the East. Differences in donor presence can be explained by demographic factors and access / security considerations; yet, perceptions of unbalanced donor support are common among the majority of municipalities, leading to possible claims of discrimination. Extending donor support to more locations and avoiding over-crowding of donors in certain municipalities is a necessity that the donor coordination group intends to achieve.

The above shows that more needs to be done to achieve a common vision on a best-fit approach to local governance and local development support in the current crisis context, with a view to strengthening crisis resilience, and in guaranteeing a fair coverage of external support across the whole country to minimize the number of aid orphans. Partnerships should go beyond coordinating activities when operating in the same location, but start from programme design all the way to monitoring and evaluation, with the objective of building a coherent evidential base to inform longer-term system development and local governance reform, which future legitimate Libyan central authorities will have to lead.

1.7. The UN support to Libya

The broader UN programmatic framework

Prior to the eruption of conflict in 2014, the UN system in Libya, under UNSMIL leadership, developed an Integrated Strategic Framework to increase alignment of UN efforts and enhance accountability in achieving targeted results. The ISF concluded in 2014 and due to the unfolding political and security crisis, priority was given to the coordination of the humanitarian response with the production of a Humanitarian Response Plan in October 2014. During the same period, the UN Department of Political Affairs together with the UN Country Team (UNCT) produced in January 2015, a Strategic Assessment of the UN presence in Libya. In the current context, this assessment recommended five priorities for the UN action in Libya: (1) Support to political process, (2) Protection, (3) Support to key institutions, (4) Support for the provision of essential services; and (5) Coordination of external support.

UNDP presence and programme in Libya

UNDP has a long history in Libya as its presence started back in the 1970s. In 1976, UNDP signed a Standard Basic Framework Agreement (SBFA) with Libya which laid down the basis for all future development cooperation.

A new era of collaboration started after the revolution in 2011. The Transitional Government of Libya requested UNDP at that time to tailor its programmes to the new governance and development challenges facing the country after 45 years of centralized authoritarian rule. UNDP's substantive engagement was re-focused on providing technical and advisory services to support a vast programme of reform in political and administrative governance systems and in nurturing the emergence of a democratic society. UNDP worked closely with UNSMIL in supporting the political transition through electoral assistance, support to the constitutional making process (with an emphasis on civic engagement) and strengthening rule of law

[48] Many of these programmes are still in the design or early implementation stages, with a number of field assessments on-going from different donors (UNDP, GIZ, VNG, ACTED, etc.). .

[49] See https://www.google.com/fusiontables/DataSource?docid=1PU1LwwOcth1mPnTwxayCS7oYKy-kC_Wy4QPUQZdY#map:id=4

[50] These are: Zuwara, Benghazi, Sebha, Tobruk, Baida, Sabratha, Zintan, Zawiya, Tripoli Center and Qasr Bin Ghishir.

institutions and a human rights culture in the country. Besides, UNDP also developed and implemented projects supporting policy aspects of local governance as well environmental protection and climate change mitigation. Cross-cutting to all sectors, UNDP implemented with the Ministry of Planning, the flagship *Capacity Strengthening Initiative* which created a capacity development facility to support Libyan institutions leading the transition and transformation of the country. During this period, the Government of Libya remained the largest donor to UNDP Libya[51] while the main international donors included the Peacebuilding Fund, SIDA, United Kingdom (DfID and FCO), the EU, the Netherlands and Japan.

With regards to local governance support, UNDP worked closely with the Ministry of Local Governance in laying the ground for a new policy framework for local governments in Libya through the provision of high-level expertise. UNDP also helped build core capacities of the Ministry's workforce (284 staff) and a total of 15 municipalities, in areas covering general principles of local governance and decentralisation, public expenditure management, transparency and accountability. Unfortunately, this policy and institution-building support had to be suspended shortly after due to the unravelling conditions.

In the context of the ongoing crisis, UNDP maintained active its programmes and projects that had strong relevance to resolving the current political deadlock and fomenting positive peace dynamics. Hence, UNDP works with UNSMIL in organizing key events sustaining the political dialogue process, provides assistance to the CDA for maintaining a strong public engagement in the drafting of the constitution in spite of the difficult circumstances and continues building core capacities of the High National Commission for Elections in anticipation of the many electoral events that could ensue a resolution of the conflict. UNDP also continues working with CSOs through the SCELT Project to step up civic engagement in the country, especially to support local peacebuilding dynamics.

Due to the crisis, UNDP is now also leading efforts among the UN Country Team to integrate an early recovery dimension into the current humanitarian operations. With that perspective, UNDP took stock of the fact that increased support to municipalities is urgently needed to help them deal more effectively with crisis impacts. For a start, UNDP launched in March 2015 a Programme Inception Plan (PIP)[52] for analyzing more precisely the situation and needs of municipalities and local communities in different conflict-affected areas and for starting to strengthen urgently-needed municipal capacities for crisis response. The PIP covers 10 municipalities and provided much of the evidence and rationale on which this new programme is built.

II. PROGRAMME STRATEGY

2.1. Programme justification:

Libya is very much at a crossroads between different pathways that could see either its return to sufficient political and security stabilization to allow the resumption of a full-fledged transition as a united nation or, at the opposite, a further slide into uncertainty, conflict and fragmentation, with massive humanitarian consequences. Between these extremes, Libya could also take the path of a slow and uneven degradation of the current situation, with certain areas falling fast into greater fighting and severe impact on livelihoods, while relative peace and stability prevails elsewhere and facilitates the emergence of strong local governance structures and arrangements, akin to 'city-states' as known in other times and place.

Whichever scenario applies in the end – or rather, combination of scenarios over time and space – the role and functions played by local actors, and chief among them municipalities, is certain to be defining and growing in importance. This role will be critical at different levels: to mitigate local drivers of conflict and cushion the impact on local livelihoods of the political and security vacuum at the country's level; to take any opportunity available to advance local recovery from a social, economic and cohesion point of view; and to help shape and implement a suitable local governance reform in the longer-term.

Given this highly unpredictable context, any programme supporting local governance in today's Libya should cater on the one hand to addressing immediate needs – and in particular for developing endogenous support mechanisms to populations at-risk that can substitute a largely insufficient humanitarian response[53] – and on the other hand for the need to develop capacities and conditions to nurture peace, state-building and recovery from below. This two-pronged approach can be best encapsulated in the concept of **resilience**,

[51] 56% of UNDP Libya's resources came from the Government of Libya in 2013.
[52] In UNDP programming procedures, a PIP is a 12-months maximum intervention consisting in activities that help better analyze the context, build rapport and trust with local stakeholders and evaluate the best course of action to address the issues and risks at stake, with the view of designing and implementing thereafter a long-term programme.
[53] For the period October 2014 – May 2015, only 36% of the Humanitarian Appeal (36 m USD) has been funded (Source: OCHA, 2015).

defined by UNDP as an inherent and acquired condition achieved by managing risks over time in ways that minimize their negative impacts, build capacities to manage and sustain development momentum and maximize transformative potential.[54] In the context of Libya, resilience means the state and society's abilities to *manage* conflict so that it does not reverse further development and to prioritize constructive collaboration as the principal approach of social interaction. Municipalities, sitting at the front line between state and society, should and could play the lead role in fomenting at the local level such constructive and collaborative approach, which is so dearly missing among national power circles, so as to cope better with the on-going conflict and eventually overcome and recover from it.

Resilience-strengthening should remain the focus of external support and put the development of self-organization and internal capacities at the heart of its approach to the conflict-development nexus. UNDP corporate priorities for resilience strengthening in fragile and conflict-affected settings fall into three categories: (i) peaceful resolution of disputes to stabilize volatile conditions; (ii) statebuilding to improve capacities, accountability, responsiveness and legitimacy; and (iii) early economy revitalization.

2.2. Programme summary:

The *Programme for Strengthening Local Capacities for Resilience and Recovery* is a 3-year programme that aims to mitigate the impact of the current crisis on local communities and assist their recovery through building capacities of local authorities, civil society, private sector and other key local actors and improving the policy and institutional environment presiding over local governance in Libya. The Programme will offer support to local actors in achieving concrete results in three areas: 1) service delivery; 2) social cohesion and community security; and 3) livelihoods and local economic recovery. Efforts will be made to maximize linkages between these three areas of work.

The Programme seeks to empower local actors to devise and implement multi-dimensional (or integrated) resilience and recovery plans that cater to essential needs of local populations for peace, security, basic services and economic livelihoods. This support will be provided through capacity-building, process facilitation, advocacy support, policy advice and targeted financing to public, civil society and private sector initiatives that can effectively contribute to achieving the Programme's intended outcome.

Support to local capacities in the current protracted crisis context needs to be provided pragmatically, taking into account the many issues pertaining to the legal and institutional frameworks organizing local governance in Libya, but with the intent of testing various policy and institutional options that could help reform local governance arrangements in the future. The current legal uncertainty and incoherence over local governance arrangements in the country should not impede efforts from development partners to strengthen right now local capacities and central – local relations. Where and when feasible and relevant, the Programme will also provide policy support for decentralisation, emphasizing the need for consultation and inclusiveness in the reform process, as well as effective donor coordination and full Libyan ownership.

Theory of Change

The theory of change that underlies the Programme rests on a number of interconnected assumptions and principles linked to UNDP's global approach to fragile and conflict-affected settings, as detailed below.

1) **Strengthening the social contract between the Libyan state and its people is essential to building societal resilience against the on-going conflict and setting back Libyan communities on a path to sustainable development.** Municipalities, as formally-elected institutions are part of the state apparatus and play therefore a direct role in shaping the social contract. A stronger social contract supports better adherence to the rule of law, which in turn provides peaceful consensual mechanisms to manage future contestations and avoid conflict escalation. A more coherent national support system to local authorities for improving services, community security and the local economy demonstrates a clear commitment of the central government to stabilize Libya as a whole and can assist in rebuilding trust between state and society.

2) **With adequate support, municipalities can better plan, lead and coordinate state and societal efforts at achieving progress where people need it most (services, social cohesion and security, economic livelihoods).** Municipalities do not have an exclusive mandate over all the above and need to work with other formal and informal actors that also play an important (and sometimes even more preponderant) in these areas, such as the local executive bodies of line ministries for running public

[54] UNDP Strategic Plan 2014 – 2017, p.

services, tribal structures and civil society in reducing conflicts and preventing violence, and private sector in generating jobs. Above all, the role of municipalities as conveners of local problem-solving and recovery-planning coalitions can have a direct effect on social peace and help strengthen the social contract. A related assumption is that local stakeholders have inherently the inclination and abilities required for collaboration and for developing collective responses but often need safer and more inclusive spaces for expressing these abilities.

3) **Fostering local conflict resolution dynamics is necessary to create environments more conducive to accept and support political settlements negotiated at the national level.** The potential (and necessity) to build peace from below, and not solely through national political dialogue, is widely recognized.

4) **Interventions that integrate and pursue concomitantly support to different societal needs (social services, social cohesion, and economic livelihoods) accelerate stabilization and transition to peace and development.** Building local capacities to address the root causes of violence and prevent its recurrence means building capacities to identify and manage a complex web of issues that link violence with social, political and economic marginalization, with elite capture, with unequal access to natural resources, with gender inequality and so forth. Mechanistic and reductionist approaches that treat problems in isolation of each other do not allow addressing sustainably drivers of conflict.

5) **Increasing the inclusiveness of local-level decision-making, from identifying problems to implementing responses, contributes to address horizontal inequalities and build more credible institutions.** Inclusiveness means in particular increasing the roles of women and youth in local governance and their access to services, protection and jobs. It means also engaging with certain stakeholders that can act as spoilers (e.g. armed formations, tribal leaders) if not involved in important decisions affecting local affairs. Identifying the specific interests and incentive needs for constructive engagement for all local governance actors through political economy analysis is a essential.

6) **Greater opportunities for Libyan women to contribute to the local political, economic and social life is beneficial to goals of peacebuilding and recovery.** Countries with greater participation of women in public and economic spheres are known to witness lower vulnerability to conflict as well as lower levels of corruption. In Libya, achieving stronger women's influence on peace and development starts with reducing the increasing violence that targets them but also asks for enabling women decision-makers to fully play their influencing role and for promoting women's participation in the labour force. Women's participation needs to go beyond a mere increased physical presence in local governments or community platforms as gender inequality is closely linked to the underlying political settlement, including the balance of power between formal and customary authorities.

Figure 1 on next page captures the chain of changes that link the proposed interventions with the results sought by the Programme and shows as well how external factors pertaining to the broader security, institutional, political and economic and social context will influence the programme impact.

Sequencing: coping, recovering, sustaining

The current conflict in Libya (including its many local specificities) calls for pursuing interventions that can deliver results on different time spans. It is not a time in Libya for engaging solely in systemic reform and ambitious institution-building efforts. Instead, the Programme will pursue a three-track approach as detailed below:

➔ The **first track** deals with the necessity to support municipalities and other local actors to immediately **cope** with the crisis situation and its negative effects on local livelihoods. This is where the programme needs to rapidly develop capacities that are critical for coordinated and effective crisis response and provide seed funding and other kind of support to implement quick-impact initiatives targeting the most affected populations. This could range from the rehabilitation or adaptation of essential service infrastructures[55] to temporary employment schemes for highly-vulnerable groups (e.g. migrants, refugees, women-headed households) or launching awareness-raising programmes against drug abuse among youth at-risk.

[55] For example, adding classrooms to schools in locations with high concentrations of IDPs.



Figure 1: Building local governance capacities in Libya to nurture resilience and recovery

- ➔ The **second track** focuses on developing further local capacities and governance mechanisms to tackle more convincingly local conflict drivers and lead multidimensional **recovery**. This requires investing in building human and organizational capabilities in local state and non-state institutions for: (i) collecting actionable evidence, analysing problems, planning, budgeting and managing appropriate responses; (ii) striking innovative partnerships that can consolidate social cohesion, improve service delivery and impulse sustainable job creation; and (iii) promoting greater engagement of local populations in local governance.
- ➔ The **third track** tackles the need to sustain a gradual **transformation** of the Libyan local governance and local development system from a policy, regulatory, institutional and cultural point of view so that it can assume increased responsibilities in achieving sustainable and equitable development for all. This track is particularly dependent on a positive outcome scenario progressively prevailing, creating thereof the necessary political momentum to sustain important structural reforms and freeing the large financial investments required to engineer such transformation.

The three-track approach applies to the concept of integrated resilience and recovery support as a whole, and for each area of intervention as well. Hence, it will influence the sequencing of programme activities for supporting basic and social service delivery, social cohesion and community security, livelihoods and local economy and for strengthening the policy and institutional frameworks. Figure 2 below schematizes the three-track approach adopted for the Programme



Figure 2: UNDP's 3-track approach to local governance support in conflict situations

The actual choice and sequencing of interventions may vary slightly from one location to another, depending on the dominant type of needs in each (life-saving, resilience-building, sustainable development), the challenges and opportunities provided by the local political and security context and the level of urgency in restoring confidence in local authorities. UNDP will negotiate with local partners the sequencing of activities and how it applies to each programmatic area.

2.3. Programme Content

The Programme is organized around four output further divided into a number of intermediary activity results striding the three years planned for implementation. A detailed Results and Resources Framework (RRF) is presented in Chapter III.

The three first outputs will be delivered primarily in select municipalities through direct support by UNDP and in cooperation with government institutions and other development partners active at the grassroots in Libya. Most activities planned under these three outputs can be initiated even in the absence or very low capacity of a unified central government.

Figure 3 : Programme Content



The last and fourth output focuses on national-level policies, institutions and governance processes that should create a more conducive environment to achieving a stable decentralization process in Libya. The feasibility of achieving this output is largely premised on the swift formation of GNA endowed with sufficient legitimacy and policy-making power and significant improvements in the security situation.

Output 1: The responsiveness of local institutions in delivering essential public services in crisis-affected contexts, with particular attention to most vulnerable groups, and in leading recovery processes, is strengthened.

The mounting humanitarian needs in Libya and increasing risk that the central state ceases to function in the absence of any stable political agreement and growing fiscal pressure, calls for quickly upgrading the capacities of local actors to support the resilience of the local service delivery systems (health, education, water, electricity, sanitation, urban infrastructure, etc.) and to improve its performance to the extent possible. This requires supporting local problem-solving mechanisms to relieve bottlenecks in the rehabilitation, operations and maintenance of local services and facilitating partnerships between central and local authorities as well as state and non-state actors, with special attention given to municipal leadership in that process. At the same time, building core managerial capacities (human / finances / asset management) of local stakeholders is critical for sustaining their increased responsibility in providing local goods and services. In a context of scarce financial resources and contested state legitimacy, the Programme will work to improve the flow of needed resources to the local level, including through dedicated funding windows, but also higher integrity in public expenditures management and stronger accountability of local decision-makers toward citizens.

Improving the resiliency of service delivery under duress means also guaranteeing that women, youth, IDPs, migrants and other marginalized groups have equally to services that are better tailored to their specific needs.

Activity Results

- Municipal capacities to plan, lead and coordinate local efforts for resilient service delivery and inclusive recovery developed.
- Core management systems of municipalities and other key institutional actors for service delivery (e.g. executive organs, civil society) strengthened.
- Improved access of local actors to capital funds and know-how for improving the infrastructure and operations of essential services.
- Increased public participation in improving service delivery and local governance.

Output 2: Municipalities and local communities have enhanced capacity to manage conflicts and promote social cohesion and community security.

The protracted state of conflict is leaving deep marks on Libya's social fabric and results in weakened social cohesion and increasing insecurity caused by rampant criminality. Of critical importance in this context is the need to capacitate state institutions at the local level to take a lead role in galvanizing support and mobilizing societal forces behind peacebuilding, community security and the broader social cohesion agenda. This output will look into strengthening the capacity of municipalities, security institutions, civil society and communities to understand local drivers of conflict, criminal violence and instability with the aim of preventing escalation of local disputes, reducing opportunities for crime, increasing the protection of the most vulnerable (e.g. women, migrants) and of promoting social cohesion in all aspects of community life. This may involve in some instances conducting reconciliation and transitional justice processes.

All activities under this output will seek to strengthen cooperation between formal and informal actors, including tribal and community leadership. Comparative experiences such as local infrastructures for peace and community security committees, whereby local homegrown structures (often led by municipalities) play

a lead role in negotiating the resolution of local conflicts and reducing criminal violence, will be explored and promoted. The Programme will engage with alternative and customary rule of law institutions so as to enable them to provide justice in a fair and non-discriminatory manner. In traditional societies and in crisis contexts, these institutions are usually more accessible and trusted for certain types of claims (especially related to family and property matters) than official judicial channels, and play a large role in settling local disputes. They may also be able to address, with proper guidance and control, larger criminality and violence-related concerns. Support will be provided through training, advocacy and small grant funding, to civil society initiatives, especially those targeting women and youth, aiming to promote social cohesion, transform local conflicts and support the reintegration of victims of violence. Eventually, the aim is to assist local actors in developing a common vision on community security and bring all stakeholders, including armed groups, to support such vision under the helm of municipalities. This will prepare the ground for the time when civilian oversight and authority over security actors can prevail.

It is important to note that this output is the most highly contextual and support will be premised on careful understanding of the situation and will be designed with broad ownership of local actors.

Activity Results

- Municipal and community capacities and systems to manage local conflicts and promote peace are strengthened.
- Local institutions are more responsive to the social cohesion and security needs of their communities.
- Women, children and youth enjoy increase safety in their communities and are empowered to play an active role in local peacebuilding processes.

Output 3: Opportunities for diversified jobs and livelihoods opportunities for youth and vulnerable groups (including women) enhanced through inclusive and participatory local economic recovery and development

Developing capacities of local authorities and other local stakeholders to better deliver basic and social services needs to be complemented with capacities to cushion local economies from the damaging effects of conflict and to nurture local inclusive recovery within the possibilities given by the overall national macro-economic context. This implies being able to analyse accurately the effects of conflict on local economic actors and their outputs, as well as individual livelihoods, to develop a vision for local economic resilience, recovery & development, to plan and implement economically-sound investments and to support local economic actors identify sectors and businesses with growth potential that can also create jobs. Such capacities will boost the response of local authorities to citizens' aspirations for stabilized livelihoods and economic opportunities. The youth, in particular, have strong expectations for job opportunities commensurate with their qualifications so as to participate constructively to society rather than involvement with armed violence being their only livelihood option.

The proposed activities intend to identify and optimize the comparative advantages of target localities, promote participatory and inclusive partnerships and strengthened coordination with key local level actors, including municipalities, relevant line ministries, CSOs, and private sector to develop and implement integrated plans and projects for an equitable and inclusive economic recovery and development, providing equal access to employment and income generation opportunities and ensuring equitable benefits to all. Support to LED planning will also help guide central and local support to job creation through the recovery of MSMEs and the development of new ones. Criteria followed to prioritize external financial and technical support should be rest with the potential for inclusive job creation potential and economic growth. Options to enhance the employability of youth (with focus on women) for placement in private sector companies through on-demand apprenticeship or on-the-job training will be explored in partnerships with private sector actors, including Chambers of Commerce. In communities hosting higher concentrations of displaced and foreign populations, the Programme will look to enhance their self-reliance through temporary employment opportunities in labour-intensive schemes for the rehabilitation of small-scale socio-economic infrastructure. Skills and vocational training will provided to individuals involved in these schemes to increase their prospects for employability in local MSMEs or larger companies or for self-employment through the MSME development stream. The proposed activities will aim to enhance economic opportunities and labour market participation of women.

Activity Results

- Strengthened capacities of local and national actors to deploy a more effective governance of local economic recovery processes.

- Enhanced resilience and recovery of micro, small and medium enterprises with good potential for job creation and positive peacebuilding and social impact.
- New local MSMEs for youth (including women) sustainable established.
- Greater access of youth (including women) to local private sector jobs.
- Enhanced self-reliance and stable livelihoods for vulnerable groups (IDPs, returnees, refugees and migrants).

Output 4: The functionality of the Libyan local governance system is enhanced by developing the policy framework, strengthening national institutions and promoting an inclusive central-local dialogue.

(Note: the scope of assistance under this output remains tentative given the high level of uncertainty on the national policy and institutional frameworks and how the international community will decide to engage with it should the formation of a GNA be considerably delayed).

Since mid-2014, the reform of local governance in Libya has been put on hold given the legitimacy crisis at the center of government, except for progress made by the Constitution Drafting Assembly in defining (with little consultation with municipal stakeholders) the broad parameters of a future decentralized state structure in the draft constitution. In the meantime, issues affecting the central – local relationship have been growing and need urgent attention as they constrain the effectiveness of the state response to the multi-dimensional impact of the conflict on Libyan populations. The Programme will therefore put priority first on supporting central and local actors through facilitation and technical assistance in finding ways to relieve current bottlenecks affecting intergovernmental relations, be they regulatory, procedural, communicational or fiscal. Support will also be provided to resume the longer-term process of implementing a full-fledged decentralisation reform, when the national policy-making machinery retrieves sufficient stability and legitimacy, and to guarantee the inclusive participation of local actors in it. The Programme will invest in building capacities of key leadership national-level institutions for shaping, supervising and supporting the local governance system such as the Ministry of Local Governance, the inter-ministerial Committee for Local Administration Strategies and the future (hypothetical) national Association of Municipalities and Supreme Council of Local Authorities.[56] Finally, in order to guarantee that the decentralisation reform and the building of new local governance paradigm in Libya be strongly demand-driven, the Programme will work with national civil society organizations and networks to strengthen civil society capacities to foment citizen participation in local governance.

Activity Results

- Regulatory, information and resource flow bottlenecks constraining the crisis response capacity of local institutions, are eased.
- The local governance policy framework is gradually and inclusively revised.
- Stronger national institutions, including associations of local authorities, to support local governance.
- More widespread culture of public participation in local governance supported by adequate civil society capacities.

2.4. Timeline:

The objectives set for the Programme have been calibrated to a proposed three-year duration. Yet, given the low visibility on the overall political and security context that will prevail during this period, more time may be needed to achieve some of the objectives, in particular in relation to Output 4 (Policy and Institutional Frameworks) and for building core capacities of municipalities. It is wise to expect as well that a follow-up programme will be needed after three years to support the implementation of decentralisation in Libya – in the hypothesis that progress will have been made in the meantime in defining its political, administrative and fiscal dimensions through legitimate legal frameworks.

The high level of contextual uncertainty and risk does not allow charting a detailed course of action for programme implementation beyond the first year. While the RRF provides general orientations that will guide programme choices and investments over the three years, a detailed work plan has only been prepared for Year 1 and is shown in Annex 4. This Annual Work Plan 2016 has been structured in a way that, under each output, distinction is made between two sets of activities:

[56] If and when formed, as per Law 59 and the draft Political Agreement negotiated by UNSMIL.

- **rapid response**, to pursue quick impact results (in Year 1) that will start relieving some of the pressing socio-economic and security/justice issues affecting local populations, and contribute to consolidate confidence in local authorities; and
- **system development,** concentrating on change processes and investments that will bring tangible results in the longer-term, in Year 2 and 3 of the programme.

As the Programme will be introduced in target municipalities (see below) according to a phased approach, the same combination of rapid response and system development interventions will most probably be applied – after incorporating lessons learnt in the first year of implementation – in municipalities engaged during the second and third years.

2.5. Target locations:

The Programme will focus on 6 municipal clusters, comprising each of 2-3 municipalities for a maximum of 15 municipalities over 3 years. The 6 cluster will be distributed among the three main regions of Libya tentatively as follows: 3 clusters in the Western region, 2 in the East and 1 in the South. The cluster approach consists in initiating support the first year to one larger municipality (or 'cluster capital') in each selected area, establish in it the programme infrastructure (office, staff, partnerships), pilot various activities planned under each output then, using the experience and capacities already established at the cluster capital level to replicate the same work plan during the second and third years to neighbouring municipalities. This approach will help encourage early on inter-municipal coordination and collaboration for conflict management, service delivery and local economic recovery and gradually support the introduction of regional development practices in Libya.

The selection of core (Year 1) and secondary (Year 2 and 3) municipalities will take place in close consultation with Libyan national and local authorities, UNSMIL and other members of the international community. Efforts will be made to avoid over-crowding municipalities where donor support is already well established and covers the same areas as those proposed in this Programme. Based on these consultations, a short-list of municipalities will be established and initial assessment work and in-depth consultations will start in these locations (building upon the work already conducted through UNDP's Rapid Diagnostic) to confirm the feasibility of programme activities in each location. On this basis, a separate tailored work plan will be developed for each municipality and a Memorandum of Understanding signed o define mutual responsibilities and contributions of UNDP and partner municipalities. Below is a list of criteria that will be taken into account for selecting the proposed first 6 core municipalities around which the clusters will be built:

- accessibility to external support (both from security and transportation point of view);
- possibility of cluster-making, i.e. proximity of neighbouring municipalities with which political, social and/or economic links already exist;
- existing level of international support, privilege municipalities with 2 or less on-going cooperation programmes;
- previous collaboration with UNDP, in particular for the 201 Rapid Diagnostic exercise; and
- conflict impact: level of damages and losses on service delivery and economic sectors, percentage of people in need (source: HNO), presence of IDPs, returnees, refugees and migrants.
- potential for recovery in terms of social cohesion, services and economy, including due to good level of initiative-taking and capacities in municipal council and administration.

Indirectly, the Programme will also gradually benefit all other municipalities in the country thanks to the policy and institutional support it will provide to central government, national civil society networks and associations of municipalities.

2.6. Cross-cutting considerations

Conflict sensitivity

The Programme will need to operate within the context of Libya's protracted insecurity and instability. The conflict environment can be expected to affect UNDP's ability to deliver programme activities in various ways, for example by limiting access. Consideration of the direct impact of conflict on the Programme is detailed, and will continue to be updated, within the project risk log (See Annex 1).

Programme design has been informed by the conflict analysis conducted by UNDP (*Analysis of Instability and Insecurity in Libya*, October 2015). Hence, programme activities have already been designed with a

focus on some of the structural causes of conflict – including the need for responsive service delivery, effective and accountable local governance, community security and peacebuilding, and the promotion of attractive economic opportunities. Preventing, managing and resolving violent conflict is at the core of UNDP's approach in this Programme and UNDP does not seek to work around conflict (a principle applying commonly to humanitarian action for example). Rather, though this programme, UNDP will seek to exploit any opportunity to positively affect conflict dynamics – and not just through specific so-called "peacebuilding" activities.

At the same time, the Programme will seek to avoid contributing inadvertently to fuelling conflict drivers by sticking to recognised principles for do-no-harm such as by maintaining a close and dynamic understanding of the context in each target location, by keeping equality of participation across community divides, as well as by building in in all activities adequate consultation and communication with the community at large.

A number of specific considerations have also been identified to make this programme conflict-sensitive.

- **Need for tailored approaches to each local area:** there is a high level of diversity between municipalities regarding development issues, drivers of conflict and power dynamics. While the Programme will follow a broadly similar approach country-wide, it will be necessary to ensure that this approach is also responsive and adaptable to the peculiarities of each location.

- **Importance of including informal local actors**: municipalities are fairly new entities within Libya – where informal community leaders, such as tribal leaders, wise men, religious leaders and others often play important roles in the community, particularly in terms of addressing disputes and insecurity. It will be essential to include these actors in programme activities, to ensure that they do not act as spoilers and to strengthen the relevance and legitimacy of municipal actions.

- **Sensitive approach to strengthening the role of municipalities**: municipalities and local communities play a growing role in public affairs and this process should be strengthened in principle to nurture resilience, peacebuilding and recovery. At the same time, further decentralisation in Libya now would suffer from an uncertain political, legal and administrative framework. Hasty efforts to strengthen local authorities in a context of such great instability could exacerbate centrifugal tendencies. To counter this, while strengthening local capacities, the Programme will also focus on developing relations and cooperation between the central and local levels, and work to resolve administrative uncertainties affecting this relationship where possible.

Women and Youth

Increasing the engagement of women, young girls and young men in local institutions involved in decision-making, whether through direct membership in municipal councils, employment in local administrations, activism in civil society or employment and entrepreneurship in the private sector, can positively influence how local institutions and policies respond better to their specific needs – but also more broadly to those of local societies as a whole. The purpose therefore of mainstreaming gender and youth priorities in a local governance programme is to promote their roles as active peacebuilders and development engines, and not solely to increase their protection from violence, whether as victims or protagonists of it.

Actions aiming to reduce the unequal access to local governance of women and youth, both in terms of processes and outcomes, should be fitting with the three objectives below:

1. **Strengthening constitutional, legislative and policy frameworks** for women and youth inclusion in local governance, and there should many opportunities to do so in Libya in the coming years if the decentralization reform can resume in earnest;
2. **Promoting institutional change within local governance institutions**, in particular municipalities, traditional structures and civil society. This will be the main entry point, in the current context, for mainstreaming gender and youth priorities and will consist in systematically: (i) building women and youth issues in local policy-making; (ii) guaranteeing as equal an access as possible to training, leadership, activism, granting and employment opportunities; and (iii) providing appropriate approaches, principles and tools that can help local governance institutions to better assess the situation and priorities of women and youth in their local policies, plans and programmes.
3. **Making better linkages between the equal participation and leadership of women and youth in local governance and the global equality agenda** in peace and development policies, and for women this means in particular framing programme interventions targeting women's participation and

protection with UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, and Libya's commitment to it.

The RRF in Chapter III clearly spells out specific activities targeting women and youth needs and participation and proposes disaggregated targets to measure the programme's effectiveness in advancing their agenda.

Capacity Development

Building capacities of local governments remains a daunting challenge in any country, let alone if it is experiencing conflict. Yet, experience shows that this challenge can be met if a gradual development-cum-empowerment model is followed: capacities of local governments can be build step-by-step in phase with a progressive increase of their prerogatives and functions. For example, strengthening leadership for organizing inclusive decision-making processes is more important at first in divided communities than the capacity to administer local taxation. In the case of Libya, right now, capacities for coordinating astutely crisis response and support to IDPs, migrants and other vulnerable groups, for example, is more critical for municipalities than procurement and contracting skills as municipalities do not yet have any real investment budget to execute. This is why establishing priorities for UNDP's capacity development support with partner ministries, municipalities and other key local beneficiary institutions is a preliminary activity in all outputs. Later on, when a more stable national governance framework is in place, the Programme will work with concerned central institutions to define a national capacity development strategy for municipalities so as to guarantee a more uniform approach and balanced capacity development support across the country.

Capacity development in this Programme will tackle 3 levels: individual, organizational (e.g. municipality, CSO or MSME), and systemic (e.g. policy and legal framework, civic culture or business environment). The Programme proposes therefore a combination of activities that responds to this multidimensional concept of capacity development.

Capacities are better built when a variety of methods, above and beyond mere skills training and knowledge transfer through workshop-based events, are used. The Programme intends to embed technical teams *within* core municipalities in each sub-region, which will in turn form and train municipal facilitation teams (see Section 4.2). Besides training workshops, the Programme will prepare customized online courses – as a means also to circumvent expected access issues, will produce user-friendly handbooks and manuals to guide local institutions in their work, will facilitate peer support and communities of practice inside Libya, and across the region as far as possible. Assisting with the improvement of inter-governmental communications and cooperation and of the regulatory environment will also go a long way in optimizing capacity development support provided at individual and organizational levels.

Finally, given the current access constraints for Libya and the necessity to keep programme costs down, UNDP will localize as much as possible capacity development resources used in this Programme. Libyan technical programme staff will be embedded for their majority in target municipalities, training and other capacity development events will be organized mostly inside Libya and the Programme will invest early on developing capacities of a few local training and technical assistance champions, in particular academic centers.

2.6. Exit Strategy & Sustainability:

In the first year or so, and for as long as the conflict brings direct negative consequences onto people's livelihoods, UNDP will ensure that programme interventions in pilot locations maximize efforts undertaken by both municipal and national authorities to respond to local needs and strengthen resilience. The sooner such capacities are developed and viable systems are put in place whereby concerned Libyan institutions and groups can devise and implement their own solutions to conflict-induced challenges (and assuming that Libyan public finances will remain available to support these efforts), the sooner will UNDP be able to phase out its support and move it to other locations or, should stability prevail, shift the balance of its support towards more strategic areas of reform design and implementation.

Nevertheless, given the current crisis context in Libya, progress on sustainability and details of an exit strategy for UNDP's technical and financial investments will happen gradually and remain highly prone to reversals.

III. Results and Resources Framework

Intended Outcome as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resource Framework: **UNDP country programme outcome 2.** Central and local government authorities are strengthened to provide better public services to citizens
Outcome indicators as stated in the Country Programme Results and Resources Framework, including baseline and targets: Baseline: (a) Public institutions suffered from weak leadership, capacity and accountability in delivering basic services. Indicator: (a) Partner institutions are delivering basic services in a transparent and accountable manner (gender-disaggregated data fused or this indicator);
Applicable Key Result Area (from 2014-2017 Strategic Plan): Outcome 3: Countries have strengthened institutions to progressively deliver universal access to basic services (SP Outcome 3) Outcome 6: Early recovery and rapid return to sustainable development pathways are achieved in post-conflict and post-disaster settings (SP Outcome 6)
Partnership Strategy
Project title and ID (ATLAS Award ID):

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
Output 1: The responsiveness of local institutions in delivering essential public services in crisis-affected contexts, with particular attention to most vulnerable groups, and in leading recovery processes, is strengthened. (linked to UNDP SP Output 6.2) Baseline: - Municipalities lack capacities, reliable data and mechanisms to effectively plan and address multidimensional early recovery and development challenges, and with a gender-sensitive focus. - Traditional and weak bureaucratic systems in local institutions (municipalities and executive bodies) - Current partnership building between local actors is ad hoc, externally	Year 1 a) 6 evidence-based municipal plans (1 to 3 years) produced. b) 25% of staff in target municipalities noting greater professionalism and responsiveness in their institution. c) 20% of population (30% among women and 40% among POCs)[58] in target locations noting improvement in the delivery of key services. d) 20% of policies linked to socio-economic matters voted by target municipal councils (incl. yearly annual plan & budget) mention explicitly gender-disaggregated needs and/or response. Year 2	1.1. Develop capacities of municipalities to plan, lead and coordinate efforts inclusively to achieve resilience in local service delivery and socio-economic recovery. • Strengthen municipal systems (incl. ICT) and skills for socioeconomic information management and sharing and problem analysis. • Building capacities and systems for improved coordination and collaboration of service delivery actors (incl. executive bodies, CSOs, etc.). • Design and implementation of participatory, integrated and programme-based diagnostic and planning processes at municipal and cluster level to produce local resilience and recovery plans. • Support greater gender-sensitivity in municipal governance through building capacities of women councillors and staff and promoting use of gender-mainstreaming tools in municipal policy-making. • Increase focus of municipal planning and policy-	UNDP UNHABITAT UNICEF (?) ACTED	*Consultants* *Training costs* *ICT/IMS services* *Construction costs* *Equipment* *Micro-grants* *Travel* *Staffing costs* **Total 1: 7,649,046** TA/CD: 4,113,114 Grants: 3,375,000 DPC/GOE: 160,931

[58] Higher target among women because women are the prime users of public services and therefore their opinion is both valued more in this regard and assumed as more credible. Higher target for persons of concern too as programme priority on addressing conflict-induced vulnerabilities.

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
driven, unstructured and reactive. – Inadequate levels of financial transparency. – Limited engagement with civil society and media. – Marked decrease in access to and quality of basic services in certain areas and even more so for the 700,000 persons of concern (IDPs, refugees, migrants). Indicators: a) number of evidence-based plans developed by municipalities and inter-municipal clusters with participation of societal stakeholders. b) percentage of municipal staff in target locations noting greater professionalism and responsiveness in their institution. c) percentage of population (disaggregated by gender and by displacement status) in target locations noting improvement in the delivery of key services.[57] *d)* Frequency of use of gender-specific indicators in municipal policies and plans in target locations.	a) 12 evidence-based municipal plans (short/mid-term) and three inter-municipal plans produced. b) 50% of staff in target municipalities noting greater professionalism and responsiveness in their institution. c) 40% of population in target locations (50% among women and 60% among POCs) noting improvement in the delivery of key services. d) 50% of socio-economic policies voted by target municipal councils (incl. yearly budget) mention gender-disaggregated needs and/or response. Year 3 a) 15 evidence-based municipal plans (short/mid-term) and 6 inter-municipal plans b) 70% of staff in target municipalities noting greater professionalism and responsiveness in their institution. c) 60% of population in target locations (70% among women and 80% among POCs) noting improvement in the delivery of key services. d) 70% socio-economic policies voted by target municipal councils (incl. yearly budget) mention gender-disaggregated needs and/or response.	making on addressing vulnerabilities, in particular among populations of concern (IDPs, migrants, refugees). • Enhance M&E frameworks and tools. • Strengthen inter-municipal coordination and cooperation. • Facilitate donor coordination for early recovery support at municipal level and alignment of donor interventions with municipal plans. 1.2. Strengthen organizational capabilities of key local institutions involved in service delivery. • Conduct various diagnostics and assessments on managerial and administrative capacities in municipalities, executive bodies and CSOs. • Provide tailored training and technical assistance to improve financial management and execution, procurement, human resources and asset management practices. • Support institutionalization of Libyan municipal capacity development expertise and resources. 1.3. Improve key service delivery lines for socioeconomic resilience and recovery through better operations & maintenance systems and increased access to capital funds. • Local service delivery audits leading to focused action plans to increase cost-effectiveness in operations & maintenance of services at local level. • Participatory standard setting for key services. • Quick impact projects to relieve service delivery bottlenecks (in particular in relation to IDP influx) • Establishment of municipal recovery / development fund to support service delivery infrastructure in conflict-affected communities. • Study potential and modalities for municipal revenue generation		

[57] Services concerned: education, sanitation and solid waste management (considered as services where municipalities play a greater role in delivery). For Persons of Concern (POCs), legal documentation services are also included.

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
		• Joint municipal service delivery schemes 1.4. Strengthen citizen engagement in improving service delivery. • Civic education on local governance and citizen rights & responsibilities in service delivery [with SCELT]. • Pilot social accountability initiatives involving CSOs and municipal administrations. • Development of municipal and civil society outreach and advocacy capacities and tools (including through the use of web portals). • Pilot initiatives to modernize municipal police capacities for enforcing local by-laws on public services, public space and increasing links with citizens.		
Output 2: Municipalities and local communities have enhanced capacity to manage conflicts and promote social cohesion and community security. (linked to UNDP SP Output 6.4) <u>Baseline</u> - Existing conflict management and dialogue efforts at local level are not sufficiently visible, remain ad hoc and reactive rather than preventative. - Level of violent criminality and threats against private property increasing across the country. - Protective system for women against violence is weak, due to institutional and cultural barriers. <u>Indicators:</u> a) Trend in the number of local conflicts[59] in target locations	<u>Year 1</u> a) 20% more than in reference year (2015). b) 3 municipalities implementing measures proposed in a municipal community security plan. c) 20% citizen stating that their sense of personal security improved in the last 12 months (30% among youth and among women). d) 30% of existing or new local peace / community security committees include women. <u>Year 2</u> a) 40% more than in reference year (2015). b) 6 municipalities implementing measures proposed in a municipal community security plan. c) 40% citizen stating that their sense	2.1. Develop municipal and community capacities and systems to manage local conflicts and promote peace: • Build local pools of expertise in dialogue facilitation. • Support the establishment of inclusive local peace structures (municipalities, elders, tribal leaders, CSOs, local media, women & youth groups and other relevant groups), and in particular the consultative *Arbitration, Mediation and Reconciliation Committee* foreseen by Law 59, and build their capacities on conflict analysis, monitoring, and resolution. • Assist local peace structures to design and implement conflict reduction plans to address main local conflict drivers. • Support civic education and promotion of a culture of peace and tolerance in partnership with education sector, mosques, civil society and cultural, social and sports clubs.	UNDP PCI UNICEF (?) UNFPA (?) UNWOMEN (?)	*Consultants* *Training costs* *Specialised services* *Equipment* *Micro-grants* *Travel* *Staffing costs* **<u>Total 2:</u> 5,188,686** TA/CD: 3,464,474 Grants : 1,632,500 DPC/GOE : 91,712

[59] According to inventory kept by municipalities

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
prevented or solved without use of violence or intentional material damage. b) Number of target locations where measures proposed in municipal community security plans are implemented. c) Trends in perceptions of levels of security among population (age and gender disaggregated). d) Presence of women in local peace / community security committees led by municipalities.	of personal security improved in the last 12 months (50% among youth and among women). d) 50% of existing or new local peace / community security committees include women. <u>Year 3</u> a) 40% more than in reference year (2015). b) 9 municipalities implementing measures proposed in a municipal community security plan. c) 60% citizen stating that their sense of personal security improved in the last 12 months (70% among youth and among women). d) All existing or new local peace / community security committees include women.	2.2. Lay down the foundation for more robust and systematic approach to social cohesion and community security. • Establish database and strengthen capacities to collect, aggregate, map and share social cohesion, violence & criminality data at local level to support policy-making on community security and social cohesion. • Support the establishment and capacity-building of municipal *Security Affairs Committee* as foreseen by Law 59, as well as of local coordination and problem-solving networks on community security, inclusive of municipalities, police and justice actors, academia, civil society, community and tribal leaders, to act as a forum for dialogue, exchange of information and common ground on violence and crime reduction. • Support local community security committees to develop integrated Municipal Community Security Plans and mainstream recommended actions into local resilience and recovery plans [see A.R. 1.1 and A.R.3.1]. • Support inter-municipal coordination and cooperation on improving community security and exchange of lessons learned & best practices. • Assess opportunities for community policing and implement pilot activities to remodel policing approach and police conduct and to empower municipal guards in supporting community security needs. • Support greater access to fair justice for all, including through customary mechanisms, by supporting community outreach, human rights training, legal awareness raising, legal aid provision and legal documentation. • Support systematic public awareness effort addressing local security and access to justice concerns and ways to combat injustice, violence &		

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
		criminality using local media outlets and active community outreach. 2.3. Empower women to play an active role in local peacebuilding and in improving their security: • Advocate for and support a larger representation of women in all committees and structures related to conflict resolution and community security. • Support inclusive local women caucuses to foster dialogue, reconciliation and tolerance. • Provide specific capacity development support to women members of local peace and security committees. • Support women CSOs for collecting data on and advocating against violence against women (VAW) through innovative community mobilization strategies targeting men and women. • Support local security coordination networks in devising and implementing VAW prevention and response activities, including provision of psycho-social counselling and reintegration support [link with AR 3.4 and 3.5]. 2.4. Encourage youth participation and involvement in local peace-building and community security • Ensure youth full engagement and suitable representation in all conflict resolution and community security committees and activities. • Engage youth in the implementation of social, cultural and sport activities programme targeting youth from both genders and across municipalities to advance citizenship, tolerance and peace. • Support youth-led initiatives to increase youth access to productive and peaceful livelihoods (link with A.R. 3.3 and 3.4).		

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
Output 3: Opportunities for diversified jobs and livelihoods opportunities for youth and vulnerable groups (including women) are enhanced through inclusive and participatory local economic recovery and development. (linked to UNDP SP Output 6.1) <u>Baseline</u> - Lack of reliable and disaggregated data and action oriented research on local economies and potential for economic recovery post 2011. - Lack of specific, sustainable and viable plans and immediate strategies for local economic growth diversification - Local businesses (MSMEs) impacted by the crisis - Lack of viable economic opportunities for jobs and income generation for youth, including vulnerable groups (IDPs, returnees, and migrants) <u>Output Indicators</u> a) Number of target municipalities and small regions implementing LER/LED projects based on collectively-defined local policies and plans. b) Number of local MSMEs and producer groups in priority sectors supported by age and gender of owner, including number of new MSMEs established. c) Number of long-term jobs and employment created through project support, by age and gender. d) Number of vulnerable individuals (according to criteria established with	<u>Year 1</u> a) 6 municipalities implement LER/LED projects. b) 200 local producer groups and MSMEs supported by age and gender of owner, including # new ones. c) 500 long-term jobs and employment created through project support, by age and gender. d) 500 vulnerable individuals (according to local criteria) benefitting from income generated from temporary jobs, by gender and age. <u>Year 2</u> a) 12 municipalities implement LER/LED projects. b) 400 local MSMEs and producer groups supported by age and gender of owner, including # new ones. c) 500 long-term jobs and employment created through project support, by age and gender. d) 1,000 vulnerable individuals (according to vulnerability criteria agreed with key stakeholders) benefitting from income generated from temporary jobs, by gender and age. <u>Year 3</u> a) 15 municipalities implement LER/LED projects. b) 400 local MSMEs and producer groups supported by age and	3.1. Strengthen capacities of local and national actors to deploy a more effective LER/LED governance response: • Analyze existing institutional capacities, processes and resources for municipalities to support LER/LED • Build capacities of municipalities and key local and national actors for managing and implementing LER/LED. • Conduct diagnostics on local economies, business environment and productive sectors including needs of MSMEs and producer groups, to feed into municipal socioeconomic databases (see A.R. 1.1) and inform LER/LED strategy-building. • Facilitate the production of LER/LED strategies. • Support the execution of priority projects identified in LER/LED strategies (e.g. value-chains, support to productive sectors, MSME development) through technical assistance and seed funding. • Increase access to sustainable project finance through building an LER/LED window in Municipal Recovery Fund (see A.R. 1.3). • Support the establishment of a national level LED unit at ministerial level to lead the policy and regulatory process and coordinate development partner actions in support of LER/LED. • Organize LER/LED forums at local, regional and national levels. 3.2. Enhance resilience and recovery of producer groups and MSMEs active in sectors with high potential for job creation and social impact, including for conflict reduction and security. • Establish and build capacities of MSME recovery committees within LER/LED Forums at local, regional and national levels. • Support recovery of local producer groups and MSMEs in sectors aligned with LER/LED	SPARK IOM UNHCR (?) IOM (?) ILO (?)	*Staffing* *Consultants* *Specialised services* *Workshops* *Grants* *Equipment* *Apprenticeship stipends* *Daily wages* **<u>Total 3:</u> 8,932,242** TA/CD: 4,516,274 Grants: 4,228,750 DPC/GOE: 187,217

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
municipalities – see 1.1) earning income from temporary jobs, by gender and age.	gender of owner, including # new ones. c) 1,000 long-term jobs and employment created through project support, by age and gender. d) 1,500 vulnerable individuals (according to vulnerability criteria agreed with key stakeholders) benefitting from income generated from temporary jobs, by gender and age.	strategies (see 3.1.) through access to cash grants,[60] asset replacement and capacity-building support • Stimulate growth and enhanced responsiveness of business development services sectors (e.g. Chambers of commerce, business development centers and business incubators) to MSME needs, including for access to markets and finance. 3.3. Support the creation of new MSMEs by youth (including women) including businesses with a social impact in sectors with high LER/LED potential. • Build capacities of municipalities in targeting youth business start-ups and producer groups • Provide skills, vocational and entrepreneurship development training for youth. • Support institutions and CSOs providing business development services / incubators for youth. • Facilitate access to finance for youth start-ups. 3.4. Increase youth access (including women) to local private sector jobs. • Conduct local labor market studies • Provide skills development training and organize apprenticeship programmes. • Support municipal labour offices to strengthen local labour market information including job opportunities and available local labor force/skills. 3.5. Enhance self-reliance and livelihoods stabilization for vulnerable and marginalized groups (incl. IDPs, returnees and migrants, with focus on women & youth) • Labor-intensive cash-for-work programmes (e.g. public infrastructure rehabilitation, solid waste management, social services, agriculture / fishery) • Skills and vocational training, and apprenticeship (see also A.R. 3.3.).		

[60] 5 – 10,000 USD per business

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
Output 4: The functionality of the Libyan local governance system is enhanced by developing the policy framework, strengthening national institutions and promoting an inclusive central-local dialogue. (linked to UNDP SP Output 3.2) Baseline: - The existing enabling framework for local governance is incomplete, inconsistent an inadequate. - Central government support (financial and technical) fails to incentivize responsive service delivery. - Lack of organized crisis response mechanisms through local institutions; only adhoc measures (e.g. emergency budgets). - Limited and difficult relations between municipalities and central institutions, including at local level (municipalities / executive bodies). - Process to design future decentralisation system has lacked inclusiveness so far. - Low public awareness on current local governance system and opportunities / challenges for decentralisation. - 39% citizens considering a fair or good level of involvement in decisions affecting their community (Source: DfID, July 2015). **Indicators:** a) Existence of strategic documents built consensually between national and local governance actors to address	Year 1 a) Existence of national strategy to boost crisis response capacity of municipalities. b) 25% of mayors satisfied with inclusiveness of dialogue process on local governance reform. c) No municipalities benefiting from regular performance evaluation. d) 45% of citizens feeling involved in local decision-making. Year 2 a) Existence of National Vision for Local Governance b) 40% of mayors satisfied with inclusive dialogue process. c) 10 municipalities benefited from performance evaluation. d) 50 % of citizens feeling involved in local decision-making. Year 3 - Existence of Decentralization Policy and Implementation Strategy - 60% of mayors satisfied with inclusive dialogue process. - 30 municipalities benefited from performance evaluation. - 55 % of citizens feeling involved in local decision-making.	4.1. Support the resolution of immediate issues constraining the crisis response capacity of local institutions. • In-depth diagnostic on core local governance functions and inter-governmental relations shaping crisis responsiveness at the local level in order to identify critical bottlenecks. • Facilitate inter-ministerial and central-local dialogue to adopt rapidly measures facilitating greater municipal capacities in addressing crisis-related issues (e.g. related to IDPs & migrant, service delivery, security and livelihoods). • Support central institutions in devising crisis-responsive procedures for municipalities, including for better coordination with executive bodies in maintaining service delivery. • Develop an interim national capacity development strategy for municipalities. • Increase connectivity between municipalities and central government through appropriate e-solutions. 4.2. Support an inclusive revision of the local governance framework in Libya: • Identify and support opportunities for minor modifications to the local governance framework that can relieve immediate issues before a full-fledged reform process is resumed. • Local government options study to propose different reform options, fitting with constitutional framework. • South /south exchanges to familiarize policy, policy makers with successful experiences of local governance reforms in post-conflict transitions. • Inclusive process to develop the policy framework for decentralisation (incl. National Vision for Local Governance, Decentralisation Policy provisions on decentralisation.	World Bank (?)	*Consultants* *Training costs* *Specialized services* *Equipment* *Micro-grants* *Travel* *Staffing costs* **Total 4: 3,009,991** TA/CD: 2,864,477 Grants : 0 DPC/GOE : 145,514

INTENDED OUTPUTS	OUTPUT TARGETS FOR (YEARS)	INDICATIVE ACTIVITIES	RESPONSIBLE PARTIES	INPUTS (USD)
issues plaguing the local governance system. b) Percentage of mayors country-wide satisfied with the inclusiveness of the local governance reform process. c) Percentage of municipalities country-wide with their performance evaluated through multi-dimensional and participatory process. d) Percentage of citizens (age and gender disaggregated) country-wide considering that they are very well or well involved in decisions affecting their local community.		4.3. Contribute to building strong central institutions to support local governance: • Comprehensive institutional development support to MoLG for its organic law, internal systems, coordination roles (government and donors), strategic communications and staff capacity development for supporting and supervising evolving local governance system. • Support to the establishment and functioning of the Supreme Council of Local Authorities (mandate, functions, structure, strategy and capacity development). • Support establishment and institutional development of a national association of municipalities • Support central institutions in establishing and maintaining a local government performance monitoring system, evaluating administrative compliance, management efficiency and local development effectiveness (linked to local development challenges identified in 1.1.). 4.4. Strengthen culture of and systems for public participation in local governance: • Establish civil society forum / network on local governance and facilitate policy dialogue with state institutions on decentralisation reform. • Support civil society forum to conduct national civic education campaign on local governance and decentralisation (at various stages of developing decentralisation reform) • Build CSO capacities to advocate for and foment active citizen participation in local governance, including through south-south exchanges. • Grant fund to support initiatives to strengthen women & youth participation in local governance (through SCELT).		

The total Programme budget, for a target group of 15 municipalities, is presented below, including UNDP's Direct Operations and General Management Support costs.

Output	2016	2017	2018	TOTAL	Breakdown		
					TA/CD*	Capital*	DPC/GOE
1	3 134 084	2 602 234	1 912 727	**7 649 046**	4,113,114	3,375,000	160,931
2	2 083 654	1 718 703	1 386 329	**5 188 686**	3,464,474	1,632,500	91,712
3	3 688 535	3 053 781	2 189 925	**8 932 242**	4,516,274	4,228,750	187,217
4	1 003 330	1 003 330	1 003 330	**3 009 991**	2,864,477	0	145,514
M&E and documentation	95 000	95 000	165 000	**355 000**	355,000	0	0
Sub-Total	10 004 604	8 473 049	6,657,311	**25 134 965**	15 313 341	9 236 250	585 374
GMS 8%	800 368	677,843	532,584	**2 010 797**			
Grand TOTAL	**10 804 972**	**9,150,891**	**7,189,895**	27 145 761			

*TA/CD = Technical assistance and capacity development (soft activities)
Capital = CSO/MSME grants, construction/rehabilitation costs, stipends for cash-for-work and apprenticeship programs.

IV. MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

4.1. Programme oversight and management structure:

The SCL2R Programme will follow a Direct Implementation Modality (DIM) whereby UNDP takes entire responsibility for the implementation of programme activities but remains guided by the principles of national ownership. Programme implementation will follow UNDP's rules and regulations. The overall accountability for programme management will also rest with UNDP Libya Country Director while day-to-day management of the activities will be with the UNDP Programme Manager reporting to the country director.

Programme Oversight Structure

At the national level, a Programme Board (PB) will be established, consisting of UNDP senior management (UNDP Resident Representative or Country Director), representatives of partnering UN agencies, technical staff from the Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Planning and Ministry of Economy, as well as donor representatives.[61] The PB will convene twice a year or as needed and assume the functions below:

- review and approve the Annual Work Plan and its eventual in-year revisions;
- review progress reports and ensures that obstacles are addressed.
- request modifications to the Programme fundamentals, such as target locations, implementation partners, thematic areas of intervention and budgetary allocations, if the Programme faces serious obstacles in implementation according to the original plan.

The PB shall seek to reach its decisions by consensus but where consensus can not be obtained, final decision will rest with UNDP.

At the local level, in each of the clusters, a Local Board (LB) will be established, consisting of UNDP technical staff, mayors, secretary-generals and one Shura Council member of each participating municipalities, Heads of the local MoLG and MoP executive bodies, and CSO representatives (including at least one woman and one youth organizations). The LB will convene on a quarterly basis or as needed and assume the functions below:

- review and approve the local Annual Work Plan and its eventual in-year revision;

[61] Should a national association of municipalities or the proposed Supreme Council of [illegible]

- review local progress and ensures that obstacles are addressed.
- mobilize local stakeholders to participate in programme activities as planned in AWP
- support the work of the Municipal Facilitation Teams (see below), review their performance and take corrective actions as required
- communicate to the public on the Programme.

Project Implementation Team

Tunis-based Team: consisting of a Chief Technical Advisor, Programme Management Specialist, Communications Specialist and a Programme Assistant.

- The Chief Technical Advisor will provide strategic and day-to-day technical guidance for the Programme and manage internal coordination between the different UNDP Libya thematic teams that will also be supporting the Programme technically. The CTA will also handle coordination with development agencies and support the Country Director for donor relations. S/he will guarantee that programme activities take stock of UNDP's global experience in conflict-affected contexts and develop South-South and Triangular Cooperation exchanges that can support programme objectives.
- The Programme Management Specialist will guarantee that programme implementation follows UNDP's POPP[62] and responds to donors' reporting requirements. S/he will be responsible to mobilize the needed support from UNDP Libya's central operations units (human resources, finances, procurement, travel & logistics).
- The Communications Specialist will be in charge of all external relations, preparations of communications product and visibility of programme achievements on printed and social media.
- Grants Officer: will be in charge of managing all grant-related transactions, including grants to CSOs and grants to MSMEs. The Grants Officer will be detached to the UNDP/SCELT Project where the current UNDP Civic Engagement Grant Fund is run from (see 4.2).
- Programme Assistant.

Libya-based Team: consisting of a Tripoli-based supervision team and field-based cluster teams.

- The Tripoli-based team will comprise of:
  - National Programme Coordinator: with authority over day-to-day technical and management decisions on behalf of the Programme Board, after taking advice from the Tunis-based CTA and Programme Management Specialist. The NPC is accountable to ensure that the results specified in the Programme document are produced to the required standard of quality and within the specified constraints of time and cost. The NPC will also act as Secretary to the Programme Board meetings.
  - Monitoring & Evaluation Assistant
  - Operations Officer
  - Programme Assistant
  - Basic Service Delivery Specialist
  - Conflict/Security Specialist
  - Local Economic Development Specialist
  - Gender/Youth/Outreach Specialist

- The Cluster Teams will be based in the largest municipality (or core municipality) in each cluster, and comprise of:
  - Field Coordinator: to support the Local Board and ensure that the local AWP is implemented in his/her cluster of assignment. S/he will the point of contact at the sub-regional level for all support provided from Tripoli and Tunis and provide inputs into programme planning and reporting activities. The FC will also have a specific technical area of expertise in one of the programme areas (services, social cohesion or local economy) and provide advice to local partners accordingly.
  - Capacity Development Officer: in charge of organizing and supporting the local Municipal Facilitation Teams (see below) in their tasks, conduct basic training and mentoring in administrative and business management to municipal administrations and other partners, and mobilize local partnerships for supporting capacity development activities.
  - Community Outreach Officer: in charge of relations with and support to civil society and community-based structures, as well as developping relations and engagement of other non-state actors into programme activities. The COO will also help develop municipal communications and public outreach capacities.

Municipal Facilitation Teams

[62] Programme and Operations Policies and Procedures

Municipal Facilitation Teams (MFTs) will be formed in each municipality partnering in this Progamme and will consist of: the Municipal Council's Deputy Chairman, a senior member of the Municipal Administration, a senior staff of the local Finance, Statistics, Economy and Planing executive bodies, and 2 representatives of civils society. Each team should include at least 3 women. MFTs will have the following functions:

- transform the Programme's technical assistance and training support, of which they will be the main beneficiaries, into local policy proposals, action plans and initiatives contributing to achieving the Programme's higher goals.
- disseminate the knowledge and skills obtained through the Programme to other individuals and institutions playing key roles in the local governance system of their locality and surrounding area so as to infuse positive change in the local administration and local governance culture;
- contribute to documenting and reflecting on their experience of implementing programme activities and provide suggestions for future improvements;
- promote results achieved by their municipality thanks to the Programe's support with the population, neighbouring municipalities, central government and other key actors, as a means to enlarge the Programme's impact and nurture positive change processes across Libya's localities.

Figure 4 : Programme management structure



4.2. Implementation modalities:

The Programme will rest on a number of modalities and tools to implement planned activities given the very difficult operational context prevailing in Libya currently and which creates the following constraints:

- extensive presence and movement of UNDP staff outside of main Tripoli area is not possible and will not be for the foreseeable future due to UN security rules;
- execution and disbursement of programme funds through central governmental channels is not possible due to legitimacy issues;
- direct execution and disbursement of programme funds through municipal authorities is not recommended due to fiduciary risks issues;
- international NGOs and private companies still operating in Libya and which could be contracted for this programme are few, given the security situation.

1) **Flexible contracted implementation capacity**: Most of Programme personnel will be employed through a human resources implementing agent that will have legal and administrative responsibility over the said personnel (see Figure 4) while UNDP retains technical and managerial responsibility. This allows flexibility in personnel movement and deployment but guarantees better UNDP accountability on the quality of programme outputs.

2) **Embedded technical assistance**: The bulk of the Programme's human resources will be deployed at the field level and hosted inside municipal administrations. UNDP will negotiate agreements with each partnering municipality that provide for the hosting of Cluster Teams inside their administration facilities and their unimpeded interaction with all relevant municipal entities and personnel, according to a mutually-agreed work plan. Cluster Teams will remain under UNDP management but will closely coordinate with municipal leadership and staff day-to-day and through the Local Boards.

3) **Local ownership**: The Programme will use three modalities to increase local ownership: (i) Signing of individual MoUs with each participating municipality; (ii) Local Boards for local oversight on implementation; and (iii) Municipal Facilitation Teams, to increase ownership of capacity development activities.

4) **Municipal Recovery Fund**: the Programme will seek to establish, in partnership with the GNA, the World Bank and other donors, a *Municipal Recovery Fund* that can effectively channel government and donor resources aimed at sustaining local initiatives for reconstruction, service delivery and local economic recovery. Seed funding is included in the Programme (Output 1) to support piloting of MRF modalities in pilot municipalities.

5) **CSO Roster & Grant Fund**: UNDP operates a Civic Engagement Grant Fund (CEGF)[63] since 2013 to support Libyan CSOs implementing projects of their own design in various areas related to civic engagement and participation. Grantees have to go through a compulsory vetting and training process (under the responsibility of UNDP's SCELT Project) before qualifying for a grant. Quality assurance is ensured by a dedicated UNDP team. Programme funds earmarked for micro-grants to CSOs (Output 1, 2 and 3), in areas such as civic education on local governance, citizen participation, peacebuilding or local economic recovery, will be disbursed through the same CGEF structure. UNDP has also produced in 2014 a mapping of 1022 CSOs in Libya that will provide a useful roster of potential implementing partners and grantees. Finally, UNDP corporate modalities for engagement with CSOs, revised in 2015, allow now working as well with non-registered entities, which is particular critical in crisis contexts in Libya where official registration systems may not be functioning or detrimental to civil society freedoms.

6) **Fast-track modality**: procurement remains one of the main operational challenges when implementing programmes in crisis contexts due to the limited number of potential vendors for certain activities (especially for training and technical assistance contracts) and the time-sensitive aspects of programme implementation (where windows of opportunity to carry certain activities may be short). For this reason, UNDP developed *fast-track* measures for procurement in such settings which help accelerate and simplify procurement for all

[63] Established under the Support to Civic Engagement in Libya's Transition [SCELT] project, which was initiated in 2012. Since its creation, the CGEF disbursed a total of 620,000 $ in grants to 30 Libyan CSOs (grant size from 10,000 to 45,000 $). A new phase (2015-2016) is underway to provide a 270,000 $ in grants to 11 Libyan CSOs, reaching therefore a total fund value of 1.65m $ for 41 CSO sub-grants.

types of services and goods, yet di not erase responsibilities and accountabilities of UNDP staff for proper utilization, oversight and reporting. Permission to follow fast-track procedures has been granted to UNDP Libya in 2015 and is renewable on a yearly basis.

7) **Regional and global UNDP support network**: as a global leader on local governance in conflict-affected contexts, UNDP's Bureau for Policy and Programme Support (BPPS) actively supports programme design and implementation from its Regional Hub in Amman and Headquarters in New York, with technical expertise, comparative experience and diagnostic / capacity development tools customized to the needs of conflict-affected settings. The Programme in Libya will also greatly benefit from UNDP's on-going support to local resilience in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey as part of its regional response to the Syrian crisis.

4.3. Partnerships

UNDP Libya will actively seeks **partnerships with national state, non-governmental and private institutions** to deliver certain activities such as field research, surveying, training, ICT system development, monitoring and more, in order to complement the personnel and capacities directly under UNDP's responsibility. This will be done on the basis of assessment of needs on the ground and matching capabilities of the parties to be engaged and where the principle of value for money is guaranteed. Academic institutions, such as Universities will be prime candidates for implementing partnerships given their specialized technical expertise, past cooperation experience with UNDP and usually good relationship with municipalities. Partnerships with national institutions and programmes such as the National Institute for Administration, Libya Enterprise (independent agency) or the Libya Reintegration and Development Programme, for example, will also be explored.

Partnership with **UNSMIL** is central to this programme. UNSMIL's political expertise is essential to build the necessary political economy understanding of sub-national governance in Libya and maintain the rolling conflict analysis that needs to inform constantly programme implementation. The approach followed, activities implemented and results achieved by the Programme also need to be consistent with UNSMIL's support to the political dialogue and the future GNA. UNDP will continue working in as much an integrated framework with UNSMIL as feasible, as it did previously and is still doing for electoral and constitutional support.

Within the framework of the UN's Integrated Strategic Framework for Libya, due for revision in 2016, and under the leadership of the UN Resident Coordinator and UNSMIL's DSRSG, UNDP will seek active **partnerships with fellow UN agencies** currently involved, or planning to be, in supporting municipal authorities and local service delivery. This is in particular the case of UNICEF, UNFPA, UN-HABITAT, UNESCO, UNHCR and UN Women. Partnerships with UN agencies will be explored in different ways, from coordination and exchange of information to integrated work plans and co-funding. The partnership model utilized with UN agencies will follow best practices gained with other joint UN programmes in conflict contexts (such as in Somalia or Iraq) and maintain sufficient flexibility to allow for maintain an agile response capacity by all agencies involved.

With the increased focus and importance of migration issues there are potential entry points and partnership opportunity for UNDP with **IOM** for support to migrants in detention centers (held for more than 3 months) for short-term income-generation opportunities and skills and vocational training based on skills profiling to enhance prospects for better economic opportunities upon their return to the countries and communities of origin.

Partnerships with **bilateral and multilateral donors and international NGOs** present in Libya will also be actively sought for reasons of aid effectiveness. The Programme has already identified ACTED, for early recovery infrastructure rehabilitation, and PCI, for local conflict management support, as partners for the Programme and will explore cooperation with Creative, VNG, Spark and other organizations working in areas of common interest. Collaboration will also take the form of information exchange, coordinated programming at the local level and co-funding of particular activities. Such partnership arrangements will build upon recommendations coming from the donor coordination group on local governance (Tunis-based).

Finally, the Programme will use **South-South Exchange and Triangular Cooperation** to support all outputs as there is plenty of relevant experiences to be found in neighbouring and regional countries. Tunisia, for example, is going through a profound decentralisation process and has interesting experience in local economic development. Sudan and Iraq can provide good examples for local conflict management, community security and social cohesion initiatives led by local actors. As stated earlier, Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are currently implementing policies and programmes to increase municipal resilience in service

delivery. UNDP aims to expose Libyan stakeholders to regional and international experiences and fostering South-South partnerships that can develop and live on even outside of the framework of the Programme and provide valuable capacity development opportunities.

V. Monitoring Framework And Evaluation

The Programme will be monitored and progress reported in accordance with UNDP standard procedures.

The Programme's RRF provides performance and impact indicators for implementation and verification. On this basis, day-to-day monitoring will be the responsibility of the National Programme Coordinator, who will utilize primary activity implementation data coming from field teams. Additional data, not available through regular monitoring, will be need to be acquired as well in order to measure the value of certain output indicators, especially those referring to perceptions among particular groups of beneficiaries. To this end, the Programme will need to contract services for conducting surveys that will help refine the indicator baseline as well as measure progress and impact.

In accordance with the POPP, the Programme will be monitored through the following actions:

Within the annual cycle

- a **Monitoring Schedule Plan** shall be activated in Atlas and updated to track key management actions/events
- on a quarterly basis, a quality assessment shall record progress towards the completion of key results, based on quality criteria and methods captured in a **Quality Management** Table.
- **Quarterly Progress Reports** (QPR) will be submitted by the NPC to donors through UNDP Project Assurance, using the standard report format available in the POPP, as well as to the Programme Board and Local Boards.
- an **Issue Log** will be activated in Atlas and updated by the NPC to facilitate tracking and resolution of potential problems or requests for change.
- based on the initial risk analysis submitted (see Annex 1), a **Risk** Log shall be activated in Atlas and regularly updated by reviewing the external environment that may affect the project implementation.
- a **Lessons-learned log** shall be activated and regularly updated to ensure on-going learning and adaptation within the organization, and to facilitate the preparation of the Lessons-learned Report at the end of the project

Annually

- **Annual Review Report**. An Annual Review Report shall be prepared by the Programme Team and shared with the Programme Board, the Local Boards and the Outcome Board in HQ. As minimum requirement, the Annual Review Report shall consist of the Atlas standard format for the QPRs covering the whole year with updated information for each above element of the QPR as well as a summary of results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at the output level.
- **Annual Programme Review**. Based on the above report, an annual programme review shall be conducted during the fourth quarter of the year or soon after, to assess the performance of the Programme and appraise the Annual Work Plan (AWP) for the following year. In the last year, this review will be a final assessment. This review is driven by the Programme Board and may involve other stakeholders as required. It shall focus on the extent to which progress is being made towards outputs, and that these remain aligned to appropriate outcomes.

Evaluation

- An external evaluation will be carried out at the end of the Programme; however where the Programme be extended for additional years, a midterm evaluation might be commissioned.

VI. Legal Context

This programme document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the SBAA between the Government of Libya and UNDP, signed on 20 May 1976.

Consistent with the Article III of the Standard Basic Assistance Agreement, the responsibility for the safety and security of the executing agency and its personnel and property, and of UNDP's property in the executing agency's custody, rests with the executing agency.

The executing agency shall:

a) put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security situation in the country where the project is being carried;
b) Assume all risks and liabilities related to the executing agency's security, and the full implementation of the security plan.

UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall be deemed a breach of this agreement.

The executing agency agrees to undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document are used to provide support to individuals or entities associated with terrorism and that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the list maintained by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1267 (1999). The list can be accessed via http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/committees/1267/1267ListEng.htm. This provision must be included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.

VII. ANNEXES

Annex 1: Risk Analysis.

Annex 2: Local Governance System Mapping

Annex 3: Main Service Delivery Lines

Annex 4: Annual Work Plan 2016

Annex 5: TORs for Key Programme Personnel (to be developed)

Annex 1: Matrix of Identified Risks, Vulnerabilities and Mitigation Measures

Risk category and description	Likelihood			Impact			Vulnera-bility	Gap analysis	Control/mitigation	Expected/ Residual	Accountability/ owner (who)		Monitoring focal point
	L	M	H	L	M	H					HQ	CO	
Strategic and political													
Mistrust from local actors (perception of lack of impartiality in conflict)	X				X		Low	UNDP is not seen as involved with political process as this is UNSMIL precinct only.	Keep low profile on logistical support provided to UNSMIL for organizing political dialogue.	Nil	-	RC/RR CD	NPC
Sidelining by other international actors/agendas (humanitarian and political)	X				X		Low	Donors are not privileging humanitarian support so far but could change if conditions rapidly worsen. Early Recovery well positioned in HRP but lack of funding. Political work is focusing mostly on central level and aims at supporting GNA, which could make it difficult to position local resilience activities at scale.	ER Advisor. Continued positioning of integrated local governance approach with UNSMIL, UNCT and Libyan government. Integrating better various ER proposals submitted to HRP.	Nil	RBAS	RC/RR CD	ER Advisor
Unclear programme positioning/ strategy		X			X		Medium	UNDP does not have a developed overall strategy for Libya, only disjointed approaches (civic engagement, constitution, LGLD, etc.); CPD outdated.	Write overall UNDP Programme Strategy for 2016/2017 (also as preparation for next CPD) so that SCL2R Programme is better framed	Nil	RBAS BPPS	CD	CD
Lack of legitimacy of national counterparts			X		X		Medium	Both governments are now in principle illegitimate and local partners (municipalities) could refuse to cooperate in activities involving them.	Use of DIM Dealing only with technical level of ministries, still respected by local actors	Low	-	CD	NPC
Coordination													
Weak coordination and synergies with other development partners working in same area		X			X		Medium	Donor coordination group is nascent and only information exchange for now; it needs stronger leadership. UNDP has not yet approached other partners with concrete partnership offers.	Present Rapid Diagnostic results and prodoc to potential donors and partners. Seek concrete collaborations to reflected in prodoc. Propose leadership of donor coordination group once CTA is in place.	Low	-	CD	CTA
Insufficient internal oversight, coherence			X		X		Medium	Limited CO human resources, absence of DCD-P, split between Tunis / Libya teams,	Appoint LGLD focal point in each programme area and project; CTA to hold weekly meetings (until DCD-P appointed)	Low	-	CD	CTA
Communications													
Negative media perception/reporting		X			X		Medium	CO communications capacity weak, remote presence, biased Libyan media	Recruit communications specialist for Programme.	Low	-	CD	Comms Sp.
Lack of visibility/under-reporting			X		X		High	CO M&E/communications capacity weak , difficulty to get reliable reports from Libya	Recruit communications specialist for Programme, establish structured reporting system, allocate funding to M&E.	Low	-	CTA	PMS

Risk category and description	Likelihood			Impact			Vulnera-bility	Gap analysis	Control/mitigation	Expected/ Residual	Accountability/ owner (who)		Monitoring focal point
	L	M	H	L	M	H					HQ	CO	
Programmatic													
Lack of funds/resources			X			X	High	Donor funding for Libya is historically limited (NCC) and donors waiting for progress on GNA.	Resources mobilization strategy Capitalize on work already done, mobilize HQ and ARH support for UNDP global experience	Medium	RBAS BERA BPPS	CD	Projects Coordinator
Slow delivery			X			X	High	Slow establishment of programme infrastructure and difficult context; limited detailed assessment of local partners' needs and capacities due to difficult access.	Fast track, dedicated operations staff in Tunis and Tripoli; first limited batch of locations (6); build upon delivery structure used for PIP	Medium	RBAS	NPC	PMS
Lack of visible results/impact			X			X	High	Programme works mostly on capacity / systems development; needs may be manifold over what programme can contribute; faulty programme design	Include seed funding for capital projects, grants, etc. and mobilize additional funding from government from Year 1 Include rapid response elements in AWP for each output	Medium	BPPS	CTA	NPC
Low quality of implementation		X				X	Medium	Lack of site oversight; lack of quality control;	Deploy rapidly Cluster Teams through manpower company and Tripoli team; follow stringent M&E plan	Low	-	CD	NPC
Obstruction from stakeholders for diverse reasons			X			X	High	Many power-holders, not all official and many are armed. Many red lines on what can be done locally in certain thematic areas.	Sign MoU with municipalities; mobilize programme boards at central & local levels to solve obstructions; engage with as many stakeholders as possible for different activities; training of staff and partners on conflict sensitive programming	Medium	-	NPC	Field Coordinators
Operational													
Restrictions on access to certain beneficiaries			X	X			High	Difficult access to migrants and refugees, especially those in unofficial detention.	Partnerships with NGOs, IOM Make support to Libyan citizens higher and more visible than to refugee / migrants	Low	-	NPC	Field Coordinators
Restrictions to capacity assessment	X					X	Medium	Potential reluctance of some municipalities for yet more assessments	Start with assessments already conducted; weave assessments with training; develop simplified assessment methodologies	Low	BPPS	CTA	NPC
Diversion of funds, fraud, corruption		X				X	Medium	Remote management; high prevalence of corruption in Libyan context	Mostly DIM, limited capital / grant funding, advances threshold, use establish grant fund mechanism	Low	-	CD	PMS
Inadequate staff profile, lack of capacity		X				X	Medium	Difficulty to find qualified staff matching specifications for some in-country locations	Flexible approach in each location with focus in priority on areas where cluster teams are qualified; use of partnerships.	Low	-	CTA	NPC

Risk category and description	Likelihood			Impact			Vulnera-bility	Gap analysis	Control/mitigation	Expected/ Residual	Accountability/ owner (who)		Monitoring focal point
	L	M	H	L	M	H					HQ	CO	
Security & safety													
Threats and attacks against UN facilities		X				X	Medium	Tripoli office only partially used; no SRA in other areas of the country.	Programme located in third-party facilities (Tripoli municipality for national team, cluster municipalities for field teams)	Low	-	CD	FSA
Programme personnel casualty or injury, threats			X			X	High	Field locations become too risky at some point due to increase in conflict or direct threats	Select locations with low to medium risk for violent escalation Insurance, Relocation, Incapacitate Use of armoured vehicles only in certain locations including for contractors Sharing UNDSS info with contractor's security focal points	Medium	BMS	CD	FSA

ANNEX 2: MAPPING OF LOCAL GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS



Local governance architecture in Libya according to Law 59



Local governance architecture in Libya in 2015



Municipal-level governance system

ANNEX 3: REVIEW OF SERVICES DELIVERED AT LOCAL LEVEL

(based on results of UNDP's Rapid Diagnostic on Local Governance and Local Development, 2015).

Type of service	Coverage and quality	Main entity in charge
Healthcare Service	Coverage is good yet Quality is Low	Min. of Health
Diseases control	Adequate	National Center for Disease Control, MoH
Education services	Coverage is high but Quality is Poor	Min. of Education
Social Assistance	Satisfactory	Min. of Social Services
Safety & Protection	Satisfactory	Min. of Social Services
Cultural, Sport & Recreation	Fair to Good	Min. of Culture & Sports
Urban Development	Weak	Min. of Housing & Amenities, City Development Authority
Sewer and Sanitation System	Moderate	Public Utility Company, Environmental Protection Authority
Social Housing	Not available	N/A
Social Infrastructure and Public Utilities	Weak to Moderate	Municipality
Water Supply:	Very Good	Min. of Water, Environmental Protection Authority
Electricity Supply	Moderate to Good	GECOL
Sewer & Sanitation Management	Moderate to Good	Min. of Water, Environmental Protection Authority
Gas Supply	Moderate	Brega Oil Company
Collection & Disposal of Solid Waste	Fair to Good	Environmental Protection Authority
Public Lighting	Fair to Good	GECOL
Public Parks, Gardens Management and Maintenance	Fair	Housing & Utilities
Public Transport	Very Weak	Transport Authority
Construction Licenses	Very Weak	Housing Sector
Graveyards	Very Good	Dept. of Religious Affairs

ANNEX 4: ANNUAL WORK PLAN 2016

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
Output 1: The responsiveness of local institutions in delivering essential public services in crisis-affected contexts, with particular attention to most vulnerable groups, and in leading recovery processes, is strengthened. Indicators: a) number of evidence-based plans developed by municipalities and/or clusters of municipalities with participation of societal stakeholders. b) percentage of municipal staff in target locations noting greater professionalism and responsiveness in their institution. c) percentage of population (disaggregated by gender and by displacement status) in target locations noting improvement in the delivery of 3 key services. d) Frequency of use of gender-specific indicators in municipal policies and plans in target locations. Baseline: a) Only 2 out of 10 municipalities used participatory planning process (UNDP Rapid Diagnostic, 2015). b) N/A c) N/A d) No municipalities using gender-specific indicators or tools in	**1.1. Develop capacities of municipalities to plan, lead and coordinate efforts inclusively to achieve resilience in local service delivery and socio-economic recovery.** • Establish and train 6 Municipal Facilitation Teams[65] to facilitate needs analysis and planning activities. • Conduct assessment of information management, planning, leadership, coordination and communication capacities of municipal institutions (council, mayor, diwan) in 6 locations and define enhancement action plan. Information management: *Rapid response*[66] • National workshop (1) on fast-track participatory diagnostic process for resilience and recovery (w/UN-HABITAT). • National workshop (1) to establish vulnerability criteria for all 6 locations and vulnerability assessment and mapping tools. • Support MFTs to conduct fast-track diagnostic focusing on most important areas for socioeconomic resilience, leading to city profiles for each location and a select number of neighbourhood profiles in most several affected areas (w/UN-HABITAT) in locations most severely-affected areas. *System development* • Develop concept, indicators and guidelines for integrated municipal database and train 6 MFTs on leading implementation. • National workshop (1) on concept, methodology and tools for gender-mainstreaming in data collection and planning. • Support ICT needs for establishing database systems in 6 locations. • Support MFTs to complete first integrated municipal baseline. • Launch Libyan municipality portal and train 6 municipalities on use. Planning & coordination: *Rapid response* • Identify urgent priority projects to support resilience in access to services through participatory process, based on fast-track diagnostics. *System development* • Support MFTs to develop annual plan and budget supporting effective resilience and recovery through participatory process using municipal baseline data. • Build capacities of municipal councils for effective and transparent review and approval of annual plans and budget. Leadership & Communications:	X X X X

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
policy-making (UNDP Rapid Diagnostic, 2015). 2016 Targets: a) 6 b) 25% c) 20% of population (30% among women and 40% among POCs)[64] d) 20%	• Develop and pilot guidelines for improved coordination between municipal councils, mayors, diwans, and executive bodies. • Training workshops (2) for mayors and municipal secretary generals on leadership, coordination and communication skills. • Training workshops (2) for women councillors and women staff in management positions on leadership, advocacy and communications skills. • Piloting of improved coordination model in 6 locations.		X	X X X					
	1.2. Strengthen organizational capabilities of key local institutions involved in service delivery. *Rapid response* • Develop and implement short-term (6 months) training programme based on municipalities' requests to upgrade staff skills needed to improve performance in most-urgent tasks impacting directly on crisis response. *System development* • Develop capacity assessment methodology for reviewing existing organizational capabilities in municipalities and key executive bodies at local level, based on UNDP's corporate approach and tools. • Conduct assessments in 6 locations to identify capacity gaps and 12- month capacity development plans for each institution involved. • Initiate implementation of capacity development plans through training workshops, online tutoring and day-to-day technical assistance. • Provide capacity development to local CSOs on project cycle management (in cooperation with UNDP/SCELT Project). • Study to identify and assess needs of Libyan institutions providing (or capable of providing) capacity development services to municipalities.	X	X X	X X	X X	UNDP		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74500 Miscellaneous TOTAL	2700 24809 13871 2250 21828 340239 1870 915 1260 3103 1590 1412 60 **415,906**
	1.3. Improve key service delivery lines for socioeconomic resilience and recovery through better operations & maintenance systems and increased access to capital funds. *Rapid response* • Support immediate rehabilitation / reconstruction needs on critical health, education and shelter facilities in 6 locations as prioritized through the city / neighbourhood profiling exercises. • Procure and install suitable energy solutions (hybrid back-up systems, solar water heating) for live-saving basic services and IDP / migrant shelters. *System development* • Develop methodology for bottom-up service delivery audits • Conduct bottom-up service delivery audits for 3 key service lines in 6 target locations and produce action plans for improved operations & management.		X X X	X X X	X X X	UNDP ACTED UN-HABITAT World Bank		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71200 Int Consult. 71300 Nat Consult. 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic.	2700 24809 21000 3500 13871 2250 25528 695199 751870 915

[64] Higher target among women because women are the prime users of public services and therefore their opinion is both valued more in this regard and assumed as more credible. Higher target for persons of concern too as programme priority on addressing conflict-induced vulnerabilities.

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
	• Conduct 6 municipal multi-stakeholder workshops for negotiating standards (including results expected after 12 months) for key service delivery lines. • Feasibility study for setting up Municipal Recovery Fund			X	X X			72500 Supplies 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74500 Miscellaneous 75700 Worksh & Conf. TOTAL	1260 3103 1590 1412 200 12000 **1,561,206**
	1.4. Strengthen citizen engagement in improving service delivery *Rapid response* • Support MFTs to organize town hall meetings and other problem-solving forums with municipal and executive bodies. • Support immediate measures to enhance grievance-handling mechanisms in municipalities. *System development* • Develop manual on local governance (concepts, functions, mechanisms, citizens' rights and responsibilities) for CSOs. • Selection of CSO partners for supporting civic engagement in each target location [in partnership with SCELT]. • Implementing capacity development programme of selected CSOs for civic education on local governance. • Diagnostic study on community engagement by municipalities (councils and administration) leading to action plan for improving community outreach and engagement in municipal processes. • Build municipalities' staff and selected CSOs' capacities on (i) organizing public outreach campaigns, and (ii) on advocacy. • Diagnostic study on municipal guards and feasibility for upgrading performance in enforcing regulations on use of public services & facilities.	X X

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
security. Indicators: e) Trend in number of local disputes[67] leading to physical violence and/or material damage. f) Number of target locations where measures proposed in municipal community security plans are implemented. g) Trends in perceptions on levels of personal security (age and gender disaggregated). h) Presence of women in local peace / community security committees led by municipalities. Baseline: a) To be measured in target locations (2015 = base year) b) 0 c) 53% Libyans [E=58, W=52, S=40] evaluate their personal security as very good (Source: DfID, 2015). d) To be confirmed Targets: e) 20% less than in 2015 (cumulative over 6 locations). f) 3 municipalities implementing measures proposed in a municipal community security plan. g) 20% of citizens feeling their personal security improved in the last 12 months (30% among youth and among women). h) 30% of local peace / community security committees include women.	• Support negotiations around and publication of municipal social peace charters in 6 locations, signed by all key local stakeholders. • Fund local CSOs to implement peacebuilding activities in support of on-going reconciliation / conflict resolution processes. • Support on-going and emerging dialogues or local mediation processes involving municipal actors and tribal leaders (both within municipality and across). *System development* • Support activation of Arbitration, Conciliation & Reconciliation Committees in 6 municipal councils (as stipulated by Law 59) and train members. • Support the undertaking of a study and options paper on mechanisms and capacities needed for institutionalizing consultative platforms at municipal level on dialogue, conflict prevention and resolution ('local peace committees'). • Implement recommendations from options study in 6 municipalities and train local human capacities as required. • Support local actors to conduct civic education campaigns on culture of peace, tolerance and citizenship, through schools, civil society, mosques and clubs. • Support the civic education campaign through grants [SCELT Grant Fund].	X X	X X X	X X X X	X X			71600 Travel 72100 Cie Services 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops TOTAL	20228 585199 1870 915 1260 3103 1590 1412 **659,206**
	2.2. Lay down the foundation for more robust and systematic approach to social cohesion and community security: *Rapid response* • Implement quick impact actions to improve data compilation and mapping on interpersonal violence and crime, including through focus groups. • Support activation of Security Affairs Committee in municipal councils and train members. • Awareness-raising of key local actors on concept and methods of community security and results achieved (including through South-South cooperation). • Implement small community security projects proposed through municipal council in support social cohesion & reduction of interpersonal violence. *System development* • Support establishment and training of municipal community security committees / platforms to increase dialogue between civil authorities, society and rule of law institutions and seek joint solutions to security problems. • Develop methodology and indicators for local diagnostics on community security and social cohesion, with municipal community security committees. • Support municipal committees to implement local diagnostics • Support development of community security plans on the basis of	X X	X X X	X X X X	X X	UNDP UNSMIL UNICEF (?) UNODC (?)		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71200 Int Consult. 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72600 Grants 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74200 Printing/Publ. 74500 Miscellaneous	2700 24809 13600 13871 2250 29128 109119 1870 915 1260 60000 3103 1590 1412 1300 7880

[67] According to inventory kept by municipalities

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
	diagnostic results and facilitate integration into municipal resilience and recovery plans (see A.R. 1.1). • Awareness-raising on human rights and access to fair justice with customary justice system actors.			X	X			75700 Worksh & Conf.	186900 TOTAL **461,706**
	2.3. Empower women to play an active role in local peacebuilding and in improving their security: *Rapid response* • Implement rapid diagnostic through local CSOs to determine extent and type of issues faced by women for their security. • Provide technical advice and small grants to local CSOs and other healthcare and social assistance facilities providing protection and reintegration support to women victims of violence. *System development* • Raise awareness of Security Affairs Committee and municipal community security committees, and broader rule of law institutions, on issue of violence against women (VAW) and means to address it. • Support establishment of women section in municipal community security committee to lay down plans for reducing violence against women. • Select and train CSOs (including women & youth) and local media in each location for training programme on advocacy and outreach on VAW. • Support pilot campaigns on VAW through CSO grants [through SCELT project] and production of creative and culturally-relevant printed and on-line materials [link with national SGBV Project].	X	X X X	X X X	X X	UNDP UN Women (?) UNFPA (?)		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71200 Int Consult. 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72600 Grants 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74200 Printing/Publ. 74500 Miscellaneous 75700 Worksh & Conf.	2700 24809 12000 13871 2250 23328 127519 1870 915 1260 168000 3103 1590 1412 10000 1340 48240 TOTAL **444,206**
	2.4. Encourage youth participation in local peacebuilding and community security initiatives. *Rapid response* • Study on youth attitudes to violence and conflict at local level. • Support local youth CSOs to identify youth champions for peacebuilding and social cohesion and provide crash course on leadership, advocacy and communications (w/ UNDP-SCELT). • Sponsor on-going initiatives led by youth champions, including for sports and culture. *System development* • Build dialogue and conflict resolution skills of youth peacebuilders at local and regional level. • Support pilot campaign on violence prevention among youth through CSO grants and production of creative and culturally-relevant printed and on-line materials [with UNDP/SCELT].	X X	X X	X X X	X X	UNDP UNESCO UNICEF (?)		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71200 Int Consult. 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72600 Grants	2700 24809 12200 13871 2250 24888 136,943 1870 915 1260 150000

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
	• Support youth-led initiatives to increase access of youth at-risk to productive and peaceful livelihoods (link with A.R. 3.3 and 3.4).			X	X			72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74200 Printing/Publ. 74500 Miscellaneous 75700 Worksh & Conf. TOTAL	3103 1590 1412 20000 2281 81615 **481,706**
	DPC & GOE					UNDP		64300 Int. mangt staff 74500 Misc	36337 492
	Sub-Total								**2,083,654**
Output 3: Opportunities for diversified jobs and livelihoods opportunities for youth and vulnerable groups (including women) are enhanced through inclusive and participatory local economic recovery and development. Indicators: a) Number of target municipalities and small regions implementing LER/LED projects based on collectively-defined local policies and plans. b) Number of local MSMEs in priority sectors supported by age and gender of owner, including number of new MSMEs established. c) Number of long-term jobs created through project support, by age and gender. d) Number of vulnerable individuals (according to criteria established with municipalities – see 1.1) earning income from temporary jobs, by gender and age. Baseline: a) To be confirmed after 6	**3.1. Strengthen capacities of local and national actors to deploy a more effective LER/LED governance response** *Rapid response* • Conduct local economic survey, including on livelihoods and MSME situation, to identify high-potential actions and economic sectors to drive job creation and contribute to resilience of local communities against conflict [linked to A.R.1.1]. • Support execution of quick-impact projects coming out of rapid survey for strengthening LER/LED governance response. *System development* • Capacity assessment of major institutions involved at local level with LED • Support establishment of municipal LED units and train staff • Activate *Economic Development Committee* in municipal council according to Law 59 and establish municipal LED forum with private sector participation. • Support development of 6 LER/LED strategies in alignment with overall resilience and recovery planning process led by MFTs. • Assist in identifying a number of projects in each location for support LER/LED strategy implementation and support project development.	X	X X X	X X X X X	X X X X X	UNDP ILO (?) UNHABITAT (?)		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71200 Int Consult. 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72600 Grants 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74500 Miscellaneous 75700 Worksh & Conf. TOTAL	2160 19847 18600 11097 1800 34282 204938 1496 732 1008 90000 2482 1272 1130 3412 1066500 **500,365**
	3.2. Enhance resilience and recovery of producer groups and MSMEs active in sectors with high potential for job creation and social impact, including for conflict reduction and security *Rapid response* • Work with municipalities to develop criteria for selecting MSMEs eligible for quick impact assistance.	X				UNDP SPARK ILO (?)		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV	2160 19847 11097 1800

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
municipalities selected b) To be confirmed c) To be confirmed d) 0 Targets: a) 6 municipalities implement LER/LED projects. b) # local MSMEs supported by age and gender of owner, including # new ones. c) # long-term jobs created through project support, by age and gender. d) # vulnerable individuals benefitting from income generated from temporary jobs, by gender and age.	• Provide small in-kind assistance package (cash grants, asset replacements, training) to eligible MSMEs in agricultural, trade, industrial or service sectors, to spur local economic recovery. *System development* • Build awareness and capacities of municipal LED units and MSME sections in municipal LED forums for MSME recovery. • Strengthen capacities and provide targeted financial support to local business development institutions and producer groups association/cooperatives. • Facilitate access of MSMEs in 6 locations to sources of capital financing (grants and loans) whether from banking sector or national programmes.		X X	X X	X X X			71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72600 Grants 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74200 Printing/Publ. 74500 Miscellaneous 75700 Worksh & Conf. TOTAL	21782 113640 1496 732 1008 426000 2482 1272 1130 2000 2200 143100 **751,765**
	3.3. Support the creation of new MSMEs by youth (including women) including businesses with a social impact in sectors with high LER/LED potential *Rapid response* • Work with MFTs and local CSOs to identify youth candidates for local business development. • Organize a youth business competition to select viable business proposals for social enterprises • Provide business start-up training and cash grant support to selected youth *System development* • Support municipalities (LED units) in developing strategy for youth business start-ups with other key local LED institutions.	X	X X	X X X	X X	UNDP SPARK ILO (?)		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops TOTAL	2160 19847 11097 1800 16182 1026160 1496 732 1008 2482 1272 1130 **1,085,365**
	3.4. Increase youth access (including women) to local private sector jobs *Rapid response* • Conduct local labor market studies, including labor force needs in private sector companies (part of the local economy and business assessments under A.R. 3.1.) • Organize demand-driven apprenticeship programme in partnership with private sector companies Provide quick-impact support assistance	X	 X	 X	 X	UNDP UNESCO (?) ILO (?)		18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel	2160 19847 11097 1800 21102

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
	(rehabilitation, equipment, and training) to vocational and professional educational institutions in locations targeted. *System development* • Capacity assessment of local labour market offices • Provide technical assistance to local labour market offices, including setting up new or strengthening of existing database, linked with socio-economic database at municipalities, especially in sectors supported through MSME grants (A.R. 3.2, 3.3). • Strengthen partnerships with existing private sector job matching services • Support municipal LED units to design apprenticeship programmes in consultation with municipal LED forums.		X	X	X X X X			72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72600 Grants 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74500 Miscellaneous TOTAL	139760 1496 732 1008 180000 2482 1272 1130 480 **384,365**
	3.5. Enhance self-reliance and livelihoods stabilization for vulnerable and marginalized groups (incl. IDPs, returnees and migrants, with focus on women & youth) *Rapid response* • Support participatory setting of local vulnerability criteria for enrolment in CFW activities. • Establish needs and potentials for cash-for-work programmes in locations with higher levels of vulnerable groups (including SWM, debris management, community infrastructure) • Build municipal capacities for managing CFW activities and linking them to strengthening resilience of services and public assets. • Implement CFW programmes *System development* • Support local CSOs and vocational and skills training institutions to conduct skills profile of CFW beneficiaries and increase their enrolment in vocational/skills development programmes (linked with AR 3.2. & AR 3.3.) • Provide job matching to vulnerable individuals with local businesses (esp MSMEs supported by UNDP) • Facilitate access to finance (microcredits/savings) through local CSOs and financial institutions for vulnerable groups and pilot the 3x6 approach (linking livelihoods support with MSME development in 3.3.)	X X	X X	X X	X X X X			18000 Assets 61300 Int Staff 71400 Service Cont. 71500 UNV 71600 Travel 72100 Services (Corp) 72200 Equip/Furn 72400 Communic. 72500 Supplies 72600 Grants 72800 IT Equip 73100 Office rent 73400 Veh.rental/Ops 74500 Miscellaneous 75700 Worksh & Conf. TOTAL	2160 19847 11097 1800 20342 280192 51496 732 1008 445000 2482 1272 1130 1258 44550 **889,365**
	DPC & GOE					UNDP		64300 Int. mangt staff 74500 Misc	76278 1033
	Sub-Total								**3,688,535**
Output 4: The functionality of the Libyan local governance system is	**4.1. Support the resolution of immediate issues constraining the crisis response capacity of local institutions** *Rapid response*					UNDP UNSMIL World Bank		18000 Assets	900

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
enhanced by developing the policy framework, strengthening national institutions and promoting an inclusive central-local dialogue Indicators: a) Existence of strategic documents built consensually between national and local governance actors to address issues plaguing the local governance system. b) Percentage of mayors country-wide satisfied with the inclusiveness of the local governance reform process. c) Percentage of municipalities country-wide with their performance evaluated through multi-dimensional and participatory process. d) Percentage of citizens (age and gender disaggregated) country-wide considering that they are very well or well involved in decisions affecting their local community. Baseline: a) Not existing (Law 59 drafted without consultation) b) To be measured c) None d) 39% (Source: DfID, 2015). Targets 2016: a) Existence of national action plan to boost crisis response capacity of municipalities. b) 25% of mayors satisfied with inclusiveness of dialogue process on local governance reform process. c) No municipalities benefiting from regular performance evaluation. d) 45% of citizens feeling involved in local decision-making.	• Conduct core government function diagnostic on central-local relations (with WB).	X						61300 Int Staff	24809
	• Organize national forum on local governance in crisis context with GNA representatives and municipalities to delineate 6-month action plan to increase support to municipalities in facing crisis-related impacts.	X						71200 Int Consultant	14700
	• Senior advisory support to GNA's cabinet to implement policy priorities decided during forum.		X	X	X			71400 Service Cont.	13781
	System development							71500 UNV	2250
	• Support core ministries (MoP, MoF, MoLG) in preparing and implementing streamlined guidelines for municipal functions in situations of crisis.							71600 Travel	18628
			X	X	X			72100 Services (Corp)	62065
	• Develop interim capacity development strategy and programme for municipalities.							72200 Equip/Furn	940
				X	X			72400 Communic.	555
	• Strengthen e-connectivity between municipalities and central government, including through upgrading the municipal web portal.							72500 Supplies	720
			X	X	X			72800 IT Equip	1693
								73100 Office rent	1230
								73400 Veh.rental/Ops	1097
								74500 Miscellaneous	1949
								75700 Worksh & Conf.	114960
								TOTAL	**260,356**
	4.2. Support an inclusive revision of the local governance framework in Libya					UNDP UNSMIL		18000 Assets	900
	Rapid response							61300 Int Staff	24809
	• Support implementation of limited amendments to local governance framework for increased functionality, based on CGF diagnostic (A.R.4.1).		X	X				71200 Int Consult.	40950
	System development							71300 Nat Consult.	21420
	• Conduct study on options for local government system on the basis of constitutional provisions (if constitution promulgated).			X	X			71400 Service Cont.	13871
								71500 UNV	2250
								71600 Travel	25628
								72100 Services (Corp)	41005
								72200 Equip/Furn	940
								72400 Communic.	555
								72500 Supplies	720
								72800 IT Equip	1693
								73100 Office rent	1230
								73400 Veh.rental/Ops	1097
								74500 Miscellaneous	2090
								75700 Worksh & Conf.	22400
								TOTAL	

EXPECTED OUTPUTS *And baseline, indicators including annual targets*	PLANNED ACTIVITIES *List activity results and associated actions*	TIMEFRAME				RESPONSIBLE PARTY	PLANNED BUDGET		
		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Funding Source	Budget Description	Amount
									281,556
	DPC & GOE					UNDP		64300 Int. mangt staff 74500 Misc	47856 648
	Sub-Total								**1,003,330**
Impact Monitoring and Knowledge Management	*Monitoring* • Establish final programme baseline by conducting additional research, secondary data analysis and field surveys. *Knowledge Management* • Document programme results achieved during Year 1 through printed, audio-visual and on-line media products. • Organize end–of-year Lessons Learnt event	X		X	X X	**UNDP**		72100 Services (Corp) 74500 Printing/Publ. 75700 Worksh. & Conf	**30000** **15000** **50000**
	Sub-Total								**95,000**
PROGRAMME TOTAL									**10,004,604**
GMS 8%									800,368
TOTAL BUDGET 2016									**10,804,972**